“A Comparative Study on Institutional Frameworks for Food Security and Nutrition at National Level”
A Comparative Study on Institutional Frameworks for Food Security and Nutrition at the National Level

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Institute of Hunger Studies – Instituto de Estudios del Hambre (IEH)
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ACRONYMS

ACSH  Latin America and the Caribbean without Hunger
CAADP  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAISAN  Inter-ministerial Food and Nutrition Security Chamber (Brazil)
CFS  Committee on World Food Security
CIP  Country Investment Plan (Bangladesh)
CNI  Child Nutrition Initiative (Peru)
CNSAN  National Food Security and Nutrition Conference (Brazil)
CONSAN  National Food and Nutrition Security Council (Mozambique)
CONSEA  National Council for Food Security and Nutrition (Brazil)
CSA  Food Security Commissariat (Mali)
DRM  Disaster Risk Management
ESAN  Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (Mozambique)
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSN  Food security and nutrition
FSC  Food Security Commissariat
GIISAN  Inter-institutional Group for Information on Food Security and Nutrition
HABP  Household Asset Building Programme (Ethiopia)
HIV/AIDS  Human immunodeficiency virus / Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
HPNSDP  Health Population and Nutrition Sector Development Programme
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IEH  Institute of Hunger Studies
INEI  National Statistical Office (Peru)
LOSAN  Organic Law on Food and Nutrition Security (Brazil)
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MINAGRI  Ministry of Agriculture (Mozambique)
MoARD  Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Ethiopia)
MoH  Ministry of Health (Ethiopia)
M&E  Monitoring and evaluation
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa's Development
NFFCSP  National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme
NGO  Non-governmental organization
NPFS  National Programmes for Food Security
NSAPR  National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (Bangladesh)
PAA  Food Acquisition Programme (Brazil)
PAMRDC  Multisectoral Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Under Nutrition (Mozambique)
PARP  Poverty Reduction Action Plan (Mozambique)
PASAN  Plan of Action on Food and Nutrition Security (Mozambique)
PBF  Family Allowance Programme (Brazil)
PESA  Special Programme for Food Security (Mexico)
PFDS  Food Procurement and Distribution System (Bangladesh)
PIF  Policy and Investment Framework
PNAN  National School Food Supply Programme (Brazil)
PNAN  National Food and Nutrition Plan (Brazil)
PNSAN  National Policy for Food Security and Nutrition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme (Ethiopia)</td>
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<td>RtF</td>
<td>Right to food</td>
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<tr>
<td>SESAN</td>
<td>National Secretariat of Food and Nutrition Security (Brazil)</td>
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<td>SETSAN</td>
<td>Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SINASAN</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition National System (Guatemala)</td>
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<td>SISAN</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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0. Executive Summary

In the last decade, international organizations, development partners and governments in developing countries have been actively supporting national strategies and programmes for food security and nutrition (FSN), designed and implemented to engage in the fight against hunger and malnutrition and effectively achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

The success or failure of these national strategies and programmes is, in part, related to the definition of adequate and clear policies, effective and inclusive coordination mechanisms and strong legislative frameworks – all of which are part of the national institutional framework for FSN. Indeed, these frameworks must be clearly defined to ensure that FSN issues and goals are effectively taken on board by various sectors and stakeholders and to ensure that the implementation of strategies and programmes lead to the achievement of FSN outcomes.

The objective of this study is to analyse and compare experiences from existing FSN institutional frameworks from different countries to identify lessons learned and guiding principles. This will help to: (i) promote reflection on ways to improve institutional frameworks for FSN; (ii) improve mechanisms for ensuring coherence and coordination among all stakeholders and initiatives designed to achieve FSN; and (iii) strengthen the commitment to food security by decision-makers and various stakeholders. This study also contributes to the design of key methodological issues for establishing or strengthening adequate FSN institutional frameworks to feed future supports in this area.

The analysis is based on four country studies (i.e. Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia and Mozambique), which were selected based on the relevance of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) support programmes and the importance accorded to FSN at the national level. They focus on three main dimensions of their FSN institutional frameworks:

- policy and programming frameworks;
- organizational and coordination frameworks; and
- legal and regulatory frameworks.

Other relevant national experiences, such as Guatemala, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru, are also considered in order to illustrate key aspects that may have contributed to, or restricted the development and effectiveness of, FSN institutional frameworks.

In this analysis, each case has its own specificities where historical, political, economic and institutional contexts frame the ways in which the FSN concept is understood and how FSN institutional frameworks are constructed and balanced. However, the analysis provides evidence on some common aspects that have definitively contributed to successful FSN outcomes, mainly: (i) extraordinary political support for FSN objectives framed in a broader development strategy and accompanied by resources; (ii) involvement of civil society and donors in the implementation and coordination processes; (iii) decentralization of FSN institutions and programmes; (iv) flagship resourced programmes addressing food insecurity and/or malnutrition; and (v) a continuous process of monitoring and accountability of results, considering the role of donors and civil society surveillance mechanisms and organizations.
The experiences show that intersectorality in FSN institutional frameworks is a gradual process that needs to be induced through longstanding actions that facilitate learning together through common implementation and monitoring of policies, strategies and programmes. Although intersectorality in FSN is a desirable approach, it is unlikely that most countries are prepared to fully benefit from these complex processes, which require relevant and consistent political support, time and investment. It is important to take into account that actions are sectorally oriented and that FSN implementation practically occurs in silos. In this regard, countries that follow multisectional FSN policies, strategies and coordination, but employ silo structures for implementation through line ministries have also shown successful FSN outcomes.

Effective FSN intersectoral and multisectional coordination occurred when FSN architectures:

- continued to receive government support in spite of a change of administration;
- involved all relevant stakeholders (e.g. civil society, private sector and development partners) in a participatory manner;
- channeled significant resources;
- had specific staff and finances allocated to coordination; and
- developed strong decentralized structures.

Successful FSN coordination architectures depended upon overcoming line-ministry resistance and taking a multisectional approach, while providing legitimacy and accreditation to coordinating structures. This was possible when coordinating structures: did not behave as implementing institutions; had strong political support and clear mandates/roles in the decision-making process at a supra-sectoral level; and contributed to conveying sectoral voices and demands at a high political level. The effective implementation of coordination mechanisms at decentralized levels was an important factor in the success of FSN coordination.

Effective sectoral institutions also have a key role in achieving FSN outcomes. The analysis showed the results of improving existing sectoral structures and programmes or restructuring public institutions for a more coherent and effective performance. Coordination among government levels in political, technical and operational arenas is also considered to be a key factor for FSN effectiveness.

Comparative analysis also showed that legislation on FSN institutional frameworks is not a panacea. The experiences demonstrate that if political support for policies and institutions is weak and if legitimacy in the construction of norms is poor, FSN processes are unlikely to be maintained over time, and FSN legislation will not be enforced and will be essentially ineffective. Successful FSN legislations are not the ones that have been started from scratch in designing new FSN systems and institutions, but those that consolidate processes, accompanied by consensus and growing institutional capacities.

Experience has also shown that it is not always successful to allow donors and international organizations to act as unconditional supporters of cross-cutting FSN policies and programmes, and in the construction of FSN institutional architectures through “big-bang approaches” without due attention to sequencing actions or political and technical feasibility. Rather, building coalitions of development partners has provided excellent ground for long-standing support for the construction of an FSN institutional framework.
Based on the experience of this analysis, the study finally proposes orientations for analysing institutional frameworks in order to better target future support to FSN institutional frameworks at country level through three key steps: (i) understanding the contexts; (ii) analysing FSN outcomes and process; and (iii) analysing the design of FSN institutional frameworks (policy and programmatic, coordination and legal frameworks).

Final remarks suggest being pragmatic and constant in supporting FSN institutional frameworks, always understanding the most valuable elements for each context and the time needed to develop and consolidate effective FSN policies, architectures and laws.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

Since 2002, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has adopted a wider approach to supporting food security and nutrition (FSN) at national and regional levels. This wider approach is aimed at supporting countries to: (i) take better account of the cross-cutting, multisectoral and multistakeholder nature of food security and (ii) ensure a scale of interventions (at the country level) likely to achieve Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1 by 2015 and improve food security for the largest possible number of people.

In this context, several FAO departments were entrusted to provide support to countries that wanted to develop their national programmes for food security and mobilize necessary funding at the domestic level and from the international community. Such programmes should, in principle, consider directives regarding major global issues, such as the Right to Food (RtF), climate change, gender, land tenure, etc.

In the early stages, the main elements of FSN national strategies and programmes were to:

- bring together the four dimensions of FSN (i.e. availability and accessibility for all, at all times, to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life);
- highlight lessons learned and good practices developed at sectoral levels;
- provide FSN in both rural and urban environments;
- combine prevention initiatives/crisis management with longer-term initiatives; and
- take care to target the most vulnerable groups.

Over the last decade, FSN strategies and programmes implemented by governments in developing countries took a number of forms. They could be integrated (or not) into other national programmes or strategies, such as national poverty reduction strategies. FSN responses were also conceived to support/strengthen various sectoral policies, especially those for the rural development sector. FSN programmes at a national level could be useful tools for implementing national policies and strategies; planning actions/investments; and coordinating and monitoring implementation at various levels (e.g. national, regional and local/household). Based on a strong political commitment, they could also serve as advocacy tools for mobilizing investments and funding.
1.2. Justification of the study

Over time, experience in defining national FSN strategies and programmes has led to a gradual increase in awareness about political and institutional issues, and this has translated into countries’ strategic choices and commitments. Even so, in spite of political commitments made at the highest level (e.g. President/Prime Minister) and governments’ adoption of nationwide FSN strategies and programmes, there are clear inadequacies in the human and financial resources generally earmarked in national budgets for implementing, coordinating, monitoring and evaluating FSN strategies and programmes. This inadequacy very often comes from the failure to set up and/or strengthen institutional frameworks when drawing up FSN strategies and programmes. Indeed, these frameworks must be clearly defined to ensure that FSN issues and goals are effectively taken on board by the various sectors and stakeholders and to establish effective coordination of actions aimed at achieving FSN.

The constraints encountered during the implementation/coordination of these strategies have included the following:

- insufficient or nonexistent adequate institutional frameworks, which results in poor recognition of the issues involved and even the sidelining of the FSN strategy/programme in the political landscape and national legislation;
- a preponderance and greater visibility of actions (and funding) aimed at prevention and especially crisis management, with no apparent link to longer-term initiatives;
- often poorly equipped institutions with scant human or operating resources for FSN coordination, governance, information and monitoring and evaluation (M&E);
- insufficient translation of FSN-related issues into national legislative and regulatory frameworks;
- weak ownership of FSN policies/strategies by government and civil society when formulated externally, without strong civil society participation and consensus building; and
- uncoordinated external aid funding individual FSN programmes and projects, with insufficient attention to strengthening the relevant institutions to ensure implementation and coordination.

Such shortcomings often limit the impact – and our knowledge of the impact – of various food security initiatives and prevent decision-makers and bodies in charge of guiding or coordinating efforts from playing their role as fully as possible. These constraints also highlight the need to strengthen the relevance of political, organizational and legislative frameworks at national, regional and global levels, in order to strengthen their impact on FSN governance.

This comparative analysis of FSN frameworks in different countries provides inputs on the ways in which FSN issues have been prioritized and integrated in policies, institutions and programmes. It also highlights the weaknesses that may have contributed to failures to integrate FSN issues into broader national frameworks.

The study contributes to the growing body of evidence indicating that success or failure in the implementation of FSN strategies and programmes is, in part, related to the existence of adequate institutional frameworks to ensure that relevant actions, sectors and stakeholders effectively lead to the achievement of FSN goals.
1.3. Objective of the study

The objective of this study\(^1\) is to analyse experiences from FSN institutional frameworks from different countries in order to identify guiding principles and lessons learned from those national experiences. The goals are to: (i) promote reflection on ways to improve institutional frameworks for FSN; (ii) improve mechanisms for ensuring coherence and coordination among all stakeholders and initiatives designed to achieve FSN; and (iii) strengthen the commitment to food security by decision-makers and various stakeholders. This study will contribute to the design of proposals for establishing or strengthening adequate frameworks for FSN, and make general and specific recommendations to FAO for its future support in this area.

2. Analytical framework

2.1. Understanding the concept of institutional frameworks for FSN

In development studies, there is no specific definition of the concept of FSN frameworks or institutional frameworks for FSN (including policy, organizations/coordination mechanisms, and regulations). It has only been possible to find references to this concept in some FAO programmes and in the approaches of the Brazilian Government and civil society.

For example, the Hunger Free Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Initiative support programme provides a concrete definition: “An institutional framework for food security is the group of organizations, norms, public policies and programmes with defined functions on food security, with a final objective of turning food and nutrition security into a national strategy with means and resources for its implementation” (Garcia, 2011:1).

From the experiences of Brazil, Maluf and Wilkinson present an in-depth definition of FSN frameworks in a recent paper, integrating five aspects:

- promotion of intragovernmental coordination both horizontally (e.g. at the national level) and vertically (e.g. linking national and local levels);
- provision of public spaces for social participation;
- recovery/re-qualification of the roles of state institutions;
- surpassing of the segmentation-fragmentation of public policies; and
- promotion of decentralization and a territorial approach (Maluf and Wilkinson, 2011).

Although Maluf's description is developed for the Brazilian context, it gives an idea of the difficulties related to implementing FSN frameworks and the complexity of analysing each of these components.

2.2. Analytical framework

In order to analyse and compare different experiences on FSN institutional frameworks and provide lessons learned, the theoretical fundamentals of analysis contrasted the design of institutional frameworks and expected FSN outcomes with existing institutional arrangements and achieved FSN outcomes.\(^2\)

The analysis focused on comparing key factors involved in implementing institutional frameworks through three main dimensions:

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\(^1\) Terms of reference of the study are in Annex 1.

\(^2\) Further details on the analytical framework used for this study can be found in Annex 2.
• Political frameworks: Assessing policies, strategies and plans, and their implementation tools (i.e. programmes and instruments), engagement in FSN issues at the political level and mobilization of funding.
• Institutional frameworks: Analysing the institutional architecture for intersectoral coordination to ensure governance for food security, with involvement, commitment, and empowerment of all stakeholders at different levels.
• Legislative frameworks: Examining support policies and institutions in order to be sure that due attention is paid to FSN.

In each of these dimensions, the Institute of Hunger Studies (IEH) contrasted the variables obtained from each case study country, linking with the achievement (or not) of expected FSN outcomes, manually coding and categorizing to bring out the relevant similarities and differences.

2.3. Methodology

The comparative analysis is based on four country studies: Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia and Mozambique. These countries were selected based on the importance of their FAO support programmes and the importance accorded to FSN at the national level. Criteria included:

• existence of a coordinating structure for FSN;
• high priority accorded to FSN by the country’s government and the existence of either significant FSN programmes and projects or adoption of an FSN strategy and/or clear affirmation of elements of FSN strategies; and
• experience in implementing FSN programmes.

An important part of the country studies builds on the results of stakeholder interviews conducted during four two-week missions to the four study countries between 1 October and 20 December 2011. Meetings were held in capital cities, while missions to rural areas were only organized in countries where FAO officials recommend that a field visit be undertaken (i.e. Ethiopia). In total, 95 people were interviewed and some of these stakeholders were key players in national governments, donor and technical assistance agencies and research and civil society organizations. Each of the country studies delivered a synthesis of lessons learned and key factors involved in the implementation of FSN frameworks. Country studies were shared, complemented and validated by FAO country offices. A summary of the case study results can be found in Annex 3.

Other relevant national experiences are also considered to illustrate key aspects that may have contributed to, or restricted the development and effectiveness of, FSN frameworks. In this sense, the study also analysed experiences from Guatemala, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru.

Using the country case study reports and a general literature review, the study adopts a comparative analysis to document the construction of different FSN frameworks and the successes and/or failures of different approaches, elaborating on the explanatory factors that lead to different FSN outcomes in each country. The analysis is based on a comparative political studies method known as a “focused comparison”, which allows for control through the careful selection of countries, and permits the researcher to consider nuances specific to each country.

Finally, the comparative study provided general recommendations for establishing or strengthening adequate institutional frameworks for FSN and for analysing these frameworks.
3. Comparing FSN institutional frameworks

The country studies provided findings on the main strengths and limitations of different national FSN institutional frameworks, which are summarized in Annex 5. From analysing commonalities and differences among the four countries, lessons were drawn about the construction of FSN frameworks and the issues that might have contributed to the improvement of FSN outcomes.

However, FSN frameworks are complex and not easily comparable in a comprehensive and structured way. Thus, a comparative analysis required comparing each of the dimensions of the FSN frameworks within their specific contexts.

For example, through comparison, some of the questions to be answered will be: How do external factors and framings on FSN influence institutional frameworks? What is the real meaning of political commitment (or political will)? Is intersectorality always the most effective way to construct FSN frameworks, or are there other options? What are the different ways of defining FSN policies and how do they integrate into FSN frameworks? What are the conditions that contribute to effective FSN coordination? What has been the role of FSN legal frameworks?

3.1. National contexts for FSN frameworks

To begin the comparative analysis, it is important to take into account both the FSN outcomes and the contexts that influence the ways in which FSN frameworks are constructed. This refers particularly to FSN macro-level contexts, but also to inherent factors based on FSN experiences in each country that contextualize the development of FSN frameworks.

On the one hand, FSN macro-level political and economic contexts significantly influence national FSN policies and the role of institutions. The analysis of the four countries demonstrates that in a market liberalization process, international food market dynamics play a key role in FSN schemes. Moreover, since the 2008 food crisis, states have used FSN frameworks to absorb shocks from the variability of international food prices, and have also used opportunities of integration in global food markets.

In countries that are fully integrated in global food markets and have increasing influence in international agricultural policies (e.g. Brazil), FSN institutional frameworks need to balance responses to local/national-level needs with interests of the agrifood sector in international markets.

In the case of Bangladesh, food dependency and the liberalization of food markets since 1995 have contributed to create a difficult scenario in a country where food production, access and consumption is highly influenced by neighbouring countries, such as India and China. In these contexts, FSN frameworks need to provide the means to facilitate access to food in adequate conditions (e.g. price and quality) for a growing population. As such, FSN frameworks need to prioritize mechanisms to adapt internal markets to unstable international food prices and to ensure adequate conditions of imported food (i.e. food safety). In the last food crisis, a combination of approaches (i.e. up-scaling safety nets, using government subsidies and establishing a rice procurement system) definitively contributed to reducing tensions related to food prices, helping the most vulnerable. Important efforts are being made to construct an effective framework for food safety, both when exporting food (e.g. particularly in the shrimp
industry) or when importing food (e.g. tainted baby milk from China was banned in Bangladesh in 2008).

In the case of Mozambique, one of the main factors contributing to food insecurity and poverty is the worsening terms of trade resulting from rising international food and fuel prices. The emergence of extractive industries is also increasing pressure on the land. However, FSN priority efforts remain focused on increasing productivity, reducing vulnerability to climate shocks and seasonality and improving access to food through safety nets.

Finally, the case of Ethiopia also demonstrates the influence of macro-level political contexts in FSN frameworks. Located in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia plays a very important geostrategic role for American and European foreign policy. This role is coupled with the acceptance of free-trade economic policies, which have made Ethiopia an ‘attractive’ aid recipient. In this context, the government and key donors are emphasizing a liberalized export-oriented agriculture economy (focused on high-value agricultural products) and are supporting the modernization of agriculture (understood as an increase in fertilizer use and improved seeds) (Spielman, 2011).

On the other hand, FSN institutional frameworks are influenced by different understandings of FSN concepts, framed according to historical and institutional backgrounds of food insecurity. Although most of the countries studied have improved their formal consideration of FSN as holistic and comprehensive comprising four pillars (i.e. production, stability, food access, consumption and nutrition), in practice, the FSN concept is understood in an unbalanced way. Bangladesh and Mozambique are clear examples of countries that have attempted to introduce balanced definitions; however, effective efforts there have been mainly in the area of availability through food production and food aid.

The historical backgrounds of these countries explain why FSN framings are not balanced in practice. In Bangladesh, for decades prior to the implementation of the current National Food Policy, food security policies were focused on increasing rice productivity for self-sufficiency, managing natural disaster risk (e.g. floods) and providing food aid to isolated areas. In Ethiopia, food security was anchored to responses to protracted crises through food aid. In Mozambique, food security concepts were developed in a post-war livelihoods-reconstruction environment.

Important efforts have been made in Ethiopia to overcome food aid, promoting the food-access pillar through income-generating activities supplemented by providing the means to buy food in the lean months. Over the past decade, Bangladesh has also promoted the food-access pillar through a number of instruments for social protection. Within these three countries, food utilization and nutrition need to be enhanced to provide a more balanced FSN policy. Mozambique is now providing relevant efforts in nutrition with an “Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition (2011-2015)”.

Conversely, in Brazil, the FSN concept has been the result of a wide-ranging social debate (see Figure 1), and its components are well balanced.
FSN framings are also related to institutional backgrounds, where power imbalances among legislative and executive branches of government, political parties and ministries are reflected. Countries that have had a continual process of institutional development and economic growth (e.g. Brazil) have proven to be better prepared to develop the complex institutional and policy reforms required to implement sound and effective FSN frameworks. The influence of historical, political and institutional backgrounds should be carefully considered when trying to replicate successful FSN schemes in policies, institutions and regulations. The Brazilian FSN framework experience is considered to be a “silver bullet” that can be replicated among different countries with very different results (Chang, 2007).

Table 1 summarizes the different framings of the four study countries. These framings contribute to the definition of different FSN institutional frameworks (i.e. policies, institutions and legislation) that will be further described in the following sections.

Table 1. Comparative framings in FSN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSN aimed at promoting equitable and sustainable ways of producing, accessing and consuming</td>
<td>FSN mainly associated with increasing agricultural production, productivity, and emergency food aid.</td>
<td>Narrowly understood as availability of and access to food, i.e. as a lack of food that can be</td>
<td>Historically linked to food availability. FSN in Bangladesh emphasizes food production and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
adequate food. Integration between economic and social actions is needed
Recent advances in nutrition contribute to a more balanced perspective
addressed by ensuring that households acquire a basic basket of agricultural goods
food aid, although recent efforts are pointing towards an appropriate balance between access, availability and nutrition.

3.2. Comparing policy and programmatic frameworks

3.2.1. FSN policies, strategies and plans

In FSN, as in other areas of development, the conceptual lines between policies, strategies and plans are blurry. “FSN policy” is a broadly used term that does not stand as a category on its own; strategies are guiding principles (to be formulated as policies), and plans are not necessarily designed as practical actions to concretely achieve the objectives defined by policies.

The four countries analysed present clear examples of the different understandings of these terms, and this contributes to the complexity involved in comparing policies, strategies and plans. There are also different framings for formulating and implementing FSN policies, strategies and plans, depending on the institutions that support the construction of these policy instruments, the level of participation of the various sectors in the formulation and implementation, the historical development of the FSN components, etc.

Our analysis identified gradations in the level of relevance of FSN policy frameworks, from guidance instruments (in the case of Mozambique) to national development strategies (in the case of Brazil).

Mozambique is a clear example of where the national FSN policy is framed as a national supra-ministerial, cross-cutting strategy that functions as a guiding strategy for sectoral policies. Mozambique’s FSN strategy, approved in 1998 (ESAN I) and expanded in 2007 (ESAN II), has influenced sectoral policies, promoting the integration of FSN into the sectoral strategic framework. Two plans of action were used to develop the ESAN,3 which was also formulated as a set of cross-cutting guiding strategies to which each sector would contribute by creating and implementing its own instrument.

Although the experience of Mozambique shows an interesting cross-cutting approach to promoting FSN implementation through sectoral policies and recent developments (ESAN II, the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP), the Multisectoral Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Under Nutrition (PAMRDC)), in practical terms, FSN is treated as a “cross-cutting issue” and is not implemented as a priority. With weak institutional support for its implementation, FSN actions in Mozambique very often fail to prevail over other sectoral priorities.

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3 Plan of Action on Food and Nutrition Security 2008-2015 (PASAN II) and Multisectoral Plan of Action for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition, 2011-2014 (PAMRDC)
In Ethiopia, the FSN national strategy is aligned with the agricultural sector policy that operationalizes the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) Compact – Ethiopia’s Agriculture Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) Ten-year Road Map (2010-2020). The basis of this policy is a two-track rural development process that allocates funding to high-potential agricultural productivity areas and simultaneously protects and promotes livelihoods in food-insecure regions. FSN policy is framed as the second track for development, focused exclusively on protecting and promoting livelihoods in food-insecure regions. The National Food Security Programme (2010-2014) develops the FSN policy, implemented through four widely-known and supported programmes: (i) the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP); (ii) the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP); (iii) the Complementary Community Investment (CCI) Programme; and (iv) the Resettlement Programme.

In Bangladesh, the 2006 national FSN policy provided a comprehensive conceptual approach and succeeded in mainstreaming FSN in national poverty strategies. The National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008-2015) was designed to implement the FSN policy. Policy and plans were constructed on the basis of several sectoral policies, providing consistency in FSN-related policies and influencing the formulation of the National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (NSAPR) (2009-2011).

In Brazil, FSN policy is qualified as a national development strategy and is considered to be a policy of policies. On one hand, the policy is not starting from zero, but emerging from existing programmes and from a longstanding institutional process. On the other hand, the FSN policy is being formulated alongside the construction of the National System for Food and Nutrition Security, which is an indispensable institutional framework for the FSN policy’s implementation. The signing of Presidential Decree 7272/2010, establishing the national FSN policy, represents an important step in determining the development of the corresponding plan. The National Food and Nutrition Plan 2012-2015 defines seven guidelines and 25 programmes agreed upon at FSN national conferences (see Table 2).

Table 2. The National Food and Nutrition Plan 2012-2015 in Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSN guidelines</th>
<th>Sectors and public policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Guideline 1: Promotion of universal access to adequate quantities of healthy food | Ministry of Social Development - Income transfer policies and distribution of food  
Ministry of Education - National School Food Programme  
Ministry of Labour - Workers’ Food Programme  
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply - Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) |
| Guideline 2: Food provisioning through the structuring of sustainable and decentralized systems of agro-ecology-based production, extraction, processing and distribution of food | Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply - Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) and Policy for Guaranteeing Minimum Prices (PGPM)  
Ministry of Agrarian Development - National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF) and Land Reform Project  
Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture - Fisheries and Aquaculture  
Ministry of Education - National School Nutrition Programme |
3.2.2. FSN programmatic approaches

Although FSN is conceptually understood in its multiple dimensions, and there is a wide consensus that FSN should be addressed intersectorally (i.e. FSN is an area in which different sectors need to work together), in practical terms the institutions that orient and finally execute the actions at the field level tend to be sectorally focused. In this realm between conceptual intersectorality and practical sectorality, this comparative analysis offers two main approaches at the programmatic level – intersectoral frameworks and multisectoral frameworks – which are well-defined by Burlandy:

[…] articulation among governmental sectors can take place in at least two ways: a) multisectoral - in which each sector identifies programmes that are priorities in terms of their scope of actions to achieve a broader governmental objective (such as FSN); and b) intersectoral - a method in which the diverse sectors build an integrated project jointly and in agreement, with a view to achieving broader objectives (such as FSN) (Burlandy et al., 2006).

Although at strategic levels FSN should be defined through intersectoral approaches, the dilemma resides in defining whether intersectorality should also be reflected at programme levels, with the risks of debilitating ownership in different line ministries, or whether it is more effective to maintain a multisectoral perspective, where programmes could be efficiently implemented through in-silo sectoral orientations. This is an interesting debate, bearing in mind that aid-effectiveness orientations align actions within standing national structures (most of them sectoral), and reality is marked by sectoral policies and powerful sectoral norms and values at the administrative level.

In addition to the programmatic structure, national case studies provide three other important variables to consider in comparing programmatic approaches: (i) the number and importance of programmes; (ii) the availability of resources; and (iii) the monitoring of the FSN situation and actions. In Table 3, programmatic approaches have been characterized on the basis of these four variables. Case-by-case analysis has shown how these factors affect the functioning of FSN frameworks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guideline 3: Institute permanent processes for education and training on food and nutrition security and the human right to adequate food</th>
<th>Ministry of Education - Public Education Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guideline 4: Promotion, universalization and coordination of food security and nutrition activities, focused on traditional communities</td>
<td>Ministry of Agrarian Development - Land Property Regularization for Guillombolas and Indigenous Peoples; Ministry of Health - Food and Nutrition Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guideline 5: Strengthening food and nutrition activities at all health care levels</td>
<td>Ministry of Health - Family Health; Food and Surveillance Nutrition System; Programme for Analysing Agrochemical Residues in Food; Prevention and Control of Malnutrition; Family Allowance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guideline 6 – Promoting universal access to good quality water in sufficient quantities</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development - Access to Water for Consumption and Production purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guideline 7 – International scope and international negotiations. Supporting initiatives for promotion of food sovereignty, FSN and human rights to adequate food</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Policies for International Humanitarian Cooperation; Emergency Inventory of the International Humanitarian Warehouse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guideline 7 The case of Peru has been incorporated to the final analysis
Table 3: Characterizing FSN programmatic approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and relevance of programmes</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of programmes</td>
<td>In-silo structure (multisectoral)</td>
<td>In-silo structure (multisectoral)</td>
<td>Proliferation of programmes</td>
<td>Proliferation and flagship programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic structure</td>
<td>Resources not necessarily oriented to FSN</td>
<td>Resources available and raising</td>
<td>In-silo structure in common planning (intersectoral)</td>
<td>Common structure (intersectoral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of resources</td>
<td>Vulnerability analysis group monitors FSN situation at technical level. Annual assessments based on multisectoral teams</td>
<td>Continuous process of monitoring and accountability of results at programme level (donor involvement)</td>
<td>Technical teams for data exchange facilitate intersectoral planning and monitoring. Still weak – although improving capacity to monitor FSN interventions,</td>
<td>Resources available and raising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring FSN situation and accountability of results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Continuous process of monitoring and accountability of results at policy level (civil society involvement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mozambique**

In the last decade, Mozambique has made some progress in improving the Global Hunger Index, however, the case study evidenced that there is still much to do if the results foreseen in the National Strategy ESAN II in 2015 are to be met.

Mozambique has a significant proliferation of programmes that contribute to FSN promotion. At the sectoral level, 16 programmes have been documented and implemented by the responsible line ministries. Each programme has different relevance to the ministries, and they are implemented in the framework of the strategies approved for each sector. The progress achieved regarding the conceptual ownership and strategic definition through narratives (“speeches”) has not yet been translated into consistent practice by various sectors of government. In practical terms, FSN continues to be mainly associated to emergency food aid and acute food insecurity, and/or with the need to increase agricultural production and productivity. This largely explains why most government sectors consider FSN to be linked to the Ministry of Agriculture.

The Mozambique country study also reveals that programmes related to FSN are not coordinated as part of a prioritized food security policy under the ESAN or the Poverty Reduction Action plan 2011-2024 (PARP). In practical terms, FSN action by government institutions is the result of the sum of a series of isolated “in-silo” programmes, and is not the result of interrelated and synergetic programmes coordinated under a common FSN strategy.

There is no direct public financing for the implementation of the ESAN II (for example, through its plan of action), and resource allocation to the programmes is channelled by each sector to the priorities in their own agendas.

A Vulnerability Analysis Group in the Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN) is actively monitoring the FSN situation at the technical level. However, intersectoral coordination and monitoring on policy and programme effectiveness is still challenging.
Ethiopia

While in Mozambique there are many instruments with different priorities according to sectoral strategies and interests, in Ethiopia there are clear priorities at the national level in the political and institutional context of CAADP to implement a few important programmes. Two flagship programmes are:

(i) the *Agricultural Growth Programme*, currently under development to support farmers in high-potential agricultural areas to increase production and productivity (a reflection of mainstreaming donor neoliberal economic discourse, supported by the World Bank and other donors, towards creating a model of an export-oriented agricultural African economy); and

(ii) the National Food Security Programme (NFSP, which involves four programmes; the *Productive Safety Net Programme* (PSNP), funded by a coalition of donors, is the most relevant and well-resourced. PSNP aims to cover the food needs of the food-insecure population in the lean months through predictable and reliable cash or food transfers in exchange for participation in public works. Within the NFSP, the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) is also interesting from a strategic point of view (it provides a graduation path from the PSNP). It aims to diversify the income sources of food-insecure households to maintain and acquire productive assets through cash or in-kind credit for investment. One of the most interesting aspects of the PSNP and the HABP, from the point of view of feasibility and sustainability, is that they use existing government mechanisms to deliver the programmes, instead of creating parallel project structures.

Two other initiatives emerge from the agricultural PIF and the NFSP, and therefore are not adequately included in the current Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan (2011-2015): the nutrition programme of the Ministry of Health and the school feeding programme of the Ministry of Education, which is very limited (i.e. it is implemented in only 3 percent of all schools). As in Mozambique, these programmes are characterized by a significant in-silo structure: the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) is responsible for food security (i.e. food availability and food access) in Ethiopia, through the promotion of increased agricultural productivity and improvements, extension of services, delivery of cash and food transfers through safety nets and transfer of microcredits in cash or in-kind to safeguard and build assets. Nutrition tasks are under the Ministry of Health which, in practice, is considered to be the sole responsible body for the implementation of nutrition programmes. The Ministry of Education carries out the school feeding programme with little support from MoARD or the Ministry of Health.

Although there is more progress to be made in reaching the MDG1 goal of reducing child underweight (with a target of 33 percent by 2015), indicators show a significant increase in crop production and productivity (Taffesse, Dorosh *et al.* 2011) and in calorie intake per adult per day (44 percent in the rural areas between 1995 and 2005) (Berhane, Paulos *et al.* 2011). In addition, preliminary results of the 2011 Demographic Health Survey indicate some modest progress in nutrition indicators (Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency 2010).
As evidenced by resource allocation, agriculture, food security and safety net programmes are government priorities. In recent years, between 13 and 17 percent of government expenditure (equivalent to over 5 percent of GDP) has been channelled towards agriculture (including natural resource management), and more than half of this expenditure supports chronically food-insecure households through the PSNP and related projects under MoARD’s NPFS (also well-supported by donors). The share of the total government budget allocated to agriculture and food security is unusually high in Ethiopia (over 10 percent) compared with other African countries (where it is generally less than 5 percent). This provides a favourable environment to implement and sustain agriculture-related development projects. However, on the side of nutrition, the national programme is mainly funded by the United Nations MDG Fund – and only for three years.

Bangladesh

There has been variable progress towards FSN in the last decade. While food production has increased, Bangladesh shows one of the world’s highest rates of acute malnutrition among children. Extraordinary effort needs to be made to achieve the national targets for reduction of stunting -38% by 2016 as per the Health Population and Nutrition Sector Development Programme (HPNSDP 2011-2016), and for reduction of underweight -33% by 2015, in line with MDG1. The FSN framework of the GoB, including the Country Investment Plan - CIP (the investment arm of the National Food Policy Plan of Action), has a harmonized set of indicators on nutrition at the highest rank of the results chain. It is expected that the recently established FSN framework will contribute aligning stakeholders’ efforts to meet this goal.

Bangladesh’s programmatic framework to translate FSN policy into action is the National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008-2015). As in Ethiopia, this programmatic framework adopts a twin-track approach, combining short-term instruments to improve food access for vulnerable households (such as cash and food transfers) with long-term interventions aimed to improve productivity and income generation.

Bangladesh has long experience in implementing instruments that feed this twin-track approach. Its main objectives are price stabilization, production support, food access for low-income households and emergency response. At the centre of these instruments is the public system of food procurement and distribution (PFDS), complemented by a number of targeted food safety-net programmes and input subsidies. PFDS assistance provides support for people living in poverty through seven programmes: Open Market Sales; Vulnerable Group Feeding; Food for Work; Test Relief Food; Vulnerable Group Development; Gratuitous Relief; and Food Assistance for the Chittagong Hill Tribes Area. There are also three nutrition programmes being implemented: Nutrition Education, Dietary Diversification through Home Gardening and Backyard Poultry; and Food Supplementation and Fortification programmes.

The Country Investment Plan (CIP) (2011-2015) is a country led planning, fund mobilization and alignment tool, facilitated by the Ministry of Food (MoFood) with support from selected donors for a coherent set of 12 priority investment programmes structured along the three pillars of the National Food Policy and of its Plan of Action, notably production/supply, access and nutrition. These programmes constitute a common planning and investing framework where different sectors (including agriculture, health, trade or social protection) can set up policy instruments and programmes oriented to common goals (i.e., intersectoral

8 Supported, among others, by Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) and Feed the Future Initiative (FFI)
programming). Contrary to the approaches of Ethiopia or Mozambique, investment programmes are well-balanced among the food security pillars, avoiding discrimination against the nutrition pillar. Incorporating the priorities of the different stakeholders, particularly at the field level, was the result of an extensive consultation process.

In contrast to Mozambique, Bangladesh tries to overcome its lack of resources by prioritizing actions and providing the investment framework needed to allocate resources coming from different sources. In fact, this intersectoral investment framework plan is said to contribute “to increase convergence and alignment of domestic and external sources of funding and the mobilization of additional resources” from development partners, the private sector and other stakeholders.

However, the Bangladesh proposal is quite new, and difficulties and risks are already projected in relation to the uneven sense of ownership among the different line ministries, the plans which have been defined and the results framework which has been constructed. In fact, the Ministry of Health’s low level of participation in the coordination body has resulted in weak articulation of nutrition issues; in-silo structures persist. It is evident that the Bangladesh FSN framework lacks expertise in financial planning within its sectoral ministries, and the country still has weak capacity to plan and monitor FSN interventions under a comprehensive approach. However, the new FSN national plan, which has been built and prepared on an intersectoral basis and is legally consolidated through relevant Government directives, is in good position to contribute to harmonization, alignment and monitoring of the interventions in food and nutrition security.

Brazil

According to the Brazilian Statistical Institute, most FSN indicators in Brazil – from agricultural production to average monthly per capita income – show outstanding progress in the last decade. In 2009, almost 70 percent of households were food secure, compared with 65 percent in 2004. Nutrition outcomes also showed very important progress: stunting rates among children under five were between 6-7 percent, whereas stunting prevalence in 1975 had been 25 percent. The Zero Hunger Programme is credited with reducing inequality to the lowest level Brazil has seen in more than 30 years.

As part of the development process of FSN policies and institutions, the Brazilian Government has adopted an intersectoral programmatic approach as its principal strategy which means that FSN activities must now be planned and executed in a fully integrated manner. There is a full set of programmes, initiatives and other measures related to FSN activities that have been created or expanded in recent years. Some of these programmes have been generically grouped together as part of the strategic Zero Hunger Programme. The integrated activities of ministries responsible for implementing policies closely linked to Zero Hunger guidelines increase the possibility of coordinated plans of action.

Most recently, the 25 programmes that contribute to implementing the national food security policy have been grouped together based on seven guidelines within the National Food and Nutrition Plan 2012-2015. Although FSN programmes have proliferated, there are a few

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9 Reference to the establishment of a CIP National committee and Technical Committee through directives MoFDM/FD/FPMU/(FSCN)-01 (66)/2008/(part-2)/184 and 185.

flagship programmes that concentrate most FSN resources, which have substantially increased over the last five years. In fact, the budget for these FSN programmes, which amounted to USD 7.2 billion in 2004, almost doubled to USD 14 billion in 2011. This period of budgetary increases is also characterized by indicators of programme success and continuous year-to-year growth, with a slightly more significant increase from 2007 to 2008 (when multi-year planning started). Flagship programmes fall mainly in the category of cash transfers (which comprise almost 47 percent of the total), such as the Programa Bolsa Familia (Family Allowance Programme, or PBF), followed by the Food Supply Programme (12.9 percent), Family Farming Programme (12.7 percent), Land Reform Project (12.6 percent) and the National School Food Supply Programme (11.6 percent).

The most relevant programmes are the PBF and the Continuing Benefit Conveyance (BPC), both managed by the Ministry of Social Development. These programmes are considered to have direct impact on food access for millions of Brazilians, either through the transfer of income to poor families or through guaranteed access to meals for workers in the formal sector. In terms of access to adequate food supply, it is also worth noting the National School Food Supply Programme (PNAE). This programme promotes good health and adequate supplies of decent quality food in state-run schools, based on a human rights-based approach.

The PBF and the PNAE have been consolidated in recent years as strategic policies to combat hunger. There has been a significant increase in the amount of public resources invested into these programmes, which has been interpreted as an initiative from the Brazilian federal government to universalize these policies. In 2009, the PNAE became universal for students enrolled in the basic public education network, and the PBF now reaches almost all Brazilian families living in poor or extremely poor conditions.

In terms of availability and production, the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF) and the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) are both essential for supporting family farms in Brazil. These programmes have become important actors in terms of national agricultural and agrarian policies. Both the Food Acquisition Programme and the National School Food Supply Programme have created management mechanisms and open precedents from a legal point of view, authorizing direct purchases from the registered family farmers and creating markets for small producers.

Institutional mechanisms allow intersectoral coordination, putting together a budget that is agreed upon by various sectors that may then be integrated into the policy management and monitoring process. Intersectorality has been more fruitful in areas that have been formulated to link local family farming production schemes with food access approaches (e.g. linking the Food Acquisition Programme and the National School Food Supply Programme) to provide space for local development.

Contrary to the cases of Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Mozambique, Brazil’s FSN National Plan has been built and prepared on an intersectoral institutional basis. Although intersectorality can move forward at a more formal level, Brazil has also encountered difficulties that stand in the way of integrated activities on a daily basis, such as differences in values and ideas; the redistribution of financial, human and political resources; time; and willingness to reorder work processes.

FSN monitoring has an important role in influencing FSN policies, programmes and budgets in Brazil. The country began with a careful analysis of its FSN situation since 2002-03 when the old census data were updated through a nutrition food spending and family food security survey by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. Since 2003, the National Council
for Food Security and Nutrition (CONSEA) has monitored FSN indicators and budgets and has sent advisory briefs to the President, together with recommendations and spending priorities. Even in 2007, the Government asked for CONSEA’s help in incorporating the human rights dimension in monitoring among sectors.

Box 1. Social control mechanisms influencing budget processes in Brazil

In theory, social control works through participation in public management. Citizens are able to get involved in the decision-making process, help the administration take steps that actually serve public interests, exert control over activities carried out by the state and demand that the public manager be accountable for his/her actions.

In Brazil, continued participation on the part of society within public administration is a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, allowing citizens to participate in the formulation of public policies and to monitor and inspect the permanent application of public resources. The creation of control and monitoring areas in relation to various public programmes and policies has been significant. Worth mentioning are the School Meals Council for ensuring the transfer of federal government resources and the Family Allowance Social Control Council for contributing to an enhanced level of focus within the system.

Social control actions are also outlined as part of the Brazilian Multi-Year Plan (2011-2015), which defines guidelines, objectives and goals for capital expenditure and for the smooth running of the four years that follow the start of the presidential mandate. It encourages interaction among various ministry activities, as well as more transparency in terms of its execution.

The work carried out by CONSEA in analysing the government’s Multi-Year Plan is very relevant. The results of the analysis enable CONSEA to suggest various budgetary allocation programmes and proposals to the President and other Ministries.

Peru

From the World Food Summit in 1996 until 2005, Peru’s progress in fighting food insecurity and malnutrition was insignificant. According to the Peruvian National Statistical Office (INEI), child stunting rates experienced a very slight reduction from 25.8 percent in 1996 to 22.9 percent in 2005, and rural figures continued at 40 percent. However, between 2005 and 2010, chronic child malnutrition rates substantially fell to 17.9 percent (31 percent in rural areas). This drop means that over 130 000 children under the age of five who would have been chronically malnourished have been spared this affliction.

A recent Institute of Development Studies report concludes that this success: (1) occurred in an unfavourable political and institutional context; (2) promoted radical changes in the provision of public services in the country; and (3) was not explained by the presence of favourable socioeconomic changes in Peru. However, three factors related to FSN policy and institutional and regulatory frameworks are likely to be intimately related to this success (Mejia, 2011):

- the alignment of social programmes with the national nutrition strategy (CRECER);
- the creation of national coordination structures and mechanisms; and
- an increase in targeted spending on nutrition programmes.
In 2006 under Toledo’s government, a National Strategy for Food Security was legally approved under the Office of the Prime Minister through Supreme Decree nº 68. Although it was never put into practice, this strategy established the organizational and administrative basis for the creation in July 2007 of a national strategy to fight child malnutrition (CRECER) through an Executive Decree under Alan Garcia’s Government.

CRECER contributed to radical changes in the government’s policy strategy for food security for the following reasons: (i) the new strategy was beyond the regular FSN food distribution approach; (ii) it focused on promoting complementarity among interventions; (iii) it prioritized decentralization such that the national government was no longer considered to be the sole provider of services; and (iv) funding for interventions was elaborated through results-based budgeting, where the Ministry of Finance and Economy monitored the use of resources.

One of the flagship social programmes associated with the reduction of malnutrition rates is JUNTOS, a conditional cash transfer programme focused on reducing poverty and children’s chronic malnutrition. Furnished with significant resources, JUNTOS’ budget was established by Law Nº 28562 in 2005, and it has significantly increased in recent years from USD 106 million in 2006 to USD 177 million in 2007 (Alcázar, 2009).

The successful experience in Peru demonstrates that there are important determinants of success in institutional frameworks. These include: (i) the continuation of government efforts (notwithstanding changes in administration) for multisectoral coordination at a higher political level, accompanied by coalitions with non-government agencies (e.g. the child nutrition initiative, which will be addressed in the following sections); (ii) the existence of a comprehensive strategy and a flagship programme for its implementation; and (iii) the allocation of government resources to fund nutrition policies.

3.3. Comparing FSN institutional architectures

Analysing FSN institutional frameworks implies assessing the institutions that are involved in the coordination, formulation, implementation and monitoring of FSN policies and programmes. Among the most important actors in FSN institutional architectures are the line ministries, particularly the departments responsible for agriculture, health, emergencies and social development. However, the roles of these line ministries in FSN policies are frequently ill-defined, and the duplication of functions among them is a common characteristic of FSN frameworks. In order to avoid duplication of responsibilities, one of the most important components of FSN institutional architectures is the creation of councils and committees to articulate and coordinate FSN policies and programmes.

This section analyses the role of line ministries and the characteristics of FSN coordinating processes and institutional structures that have been created in many countries. In particular, to compare institutional structures for the coordination of FSN, this section focuses on:

- addressing the question of FSN institutional dependencies, effectiveness and roles;
- identifying key variables for analysing FSN institutional architectures from successful institutional processes; and
- mapping the existing architectures to highlight the differences among countries.
3.3.1. FSN institutional dependencies, effectiveness and roles

The debates on FSN institutional architectures are often centred on FSN institutional dependencies, addressing two main questions: Whose line ministries should be responsible for FSN institutional frameworks? Should FSN institutional structures frameworks report to a line ministry or to a political body at a higher level?

Although in this chapter the issue on institutional dependencies will be analysed, the focus will also be on two questions only marginally considered, which are the basis of effectiveness in FSN institutional frameworks: institutional effectiveness for implementation and institutional capacities for coordination of FSN issues. From country to country, it is difficult to define which line ministry takes precedence over other line ministries on FSN policies. For example, a recent analysis by FAO’s Latin America and the Caribbean without Hunger Programme (ALCSH) showed the tendency for social development ministries to progressively take over the functions related to rural poverty and the management of FSN programmes in Latin America. Table 4 shows the prevalence of different ministries in FSN frameworks in Latin America.11

Table 4: Prevalence of line ministries in leading FSN policies in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Social Development</th>
<th>Ministry of Agriculture</th>
<th>Balanced between ministries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from ALCSH 2011

Table 5 compares the different dependencies in the four countries analysed, which are very much related to the FSN framings described in the first section of this analysis: Mozambique and Ethiopia depend more on the agriculture line ministry, Bangladesh’s coordinating schemes report to the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, and Brazil reports to the Social Development Ministry.

Table 5: Institutional frameworks for FSN coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS)</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD)</td>
<td>Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MFDM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 In a few countries, the Ministry of Health leads FSN frameworks, but they actively participate in these frameworks.
The analysis shows that there is still an active debate at national levels regarding the implications of the dependency of interministerial coordination mechanisms on sectoral ministries, and the level at which these mechanisms should be housed.

In Brazil, CONSEA suggested, through an Explanatory Memorandum in 2009, the transfer of the CAISAN executive secretary from the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger to the President of the Republic, given the importance of the FSN policy within the government’s structure and the need to ensure intersectoral effectiveness. On this matter, some of the study respondents indicated that the national plan would be more effective in terms of intersectorality if the National Secretariat of Food and Nutrition Security (SESAN) and CAISAN were connected to the Presidency of the Republic rather than to the Ministry of Social Development, as this would generate more support, strengthen the intersectoral perspective and place FSN as an axis of development. This reasoning is also based on the argument that public policy objectives of an integrated nature (such as FSN) are strategic in terms of Brazil’s development, and should not be confined to sectoral decision-making areas.

In Mozambique, the creation of a National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSAN) directly under the Prime Minister’s Office was also proposed, but it was not accepted. The advances and setbacks in this process were explained by the financial constraints associated with the creation of new institutions.

In Bangladesh, after the experience of the non-operational National Nutrition Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, some interviewees considered a Cabinet-level committee (such as the Food Planning and Monitoring Committee), chaired by one of the ministers, to be more efficient. By contrast, others argued that the location of this Committee under the leadership of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management would not provide incentives to the other ministries to develop a sense of ownership. Some claimed that non-sectoral ministries, such as the Ministry of Planning or the Ministry of Finance, which are strong and have a broad vision of national policies, could better lead the process, with the argument that sectoral ministries are usually more concerned with preserving their leading role on sectoral issues than on working together towards common outcomes.

In other countries, such as Peru, the creation of the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (CRECER) implied an important structural modification by upgrading the responsibility for fighting against hunger and malnutrition from the Ministry of Development to the Technical Secretariat of the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Social Affairs, housed in the Prime Minister’s Office. The conformation of these national coordination structures and mechanisms at a higher level has been reported to be one of the factors of success in FSN outcomes.

As reported, debates are mainly related to which institution should lead FSN programmes, but not to the processes needed within the institutions to implement effective FSN strategies and programmes.

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12 Since this study is based on the country reports and related field analysis, which in the case of Bangladesh was undertaken end of 2011, it may not take into account developments or new findings available after that period. Further details on the progress made by Bangladesh in this regard may be found in the National Food Policy Plan of Action and Country Investment Plan Monitoring Report 2012, July 2012, Dhaka, Bangladesh (http://www.nfpcsp.org/agridrupal/content/national-food-policy-plan-action-and-country-investment-plan-monitoring-report-2012).
Ethiopia is an exception (probably because there is no intersectoral coordination structure). In this country, institutional debates have focused on reforms needed within the ministries to provide better FSN outcomes (see Box 2).

**Box 2. Ethiopia: Centring the debates in more effective institutions**

Ethiopia’s restructuring process refers to the successful method of combining emergency and development interventions in the fields of food security and agriculture through the integration of the Disaster Risk Management Agency (DRM) in the MoARD. This process is part of the World Bank’s *Business Process Reengineering Support* to Ethiopia, designed to restructure government institutions to enhance accountability, action-oriented structures and efficiency. An example of this reengineering has been the transfer of responsibilities for disaster risk management from an independent agency at the ministry level to the Ministry of Agriculture (see figure below). This restructuring has brought significant benefits: it acknowledges the relationship between improvements in agriculture and disasters, and builds on the capacity of the safety net provided by the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) to scale-up in emergency situations.

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**Restructuring MoARD to incorporate Safety Net and Disaster Response**

In Ethiopia, drought is recurrent, so this must be factored into developmental activities. The disaster risk management directorate now has a stronger link (as shown in the figure above) to the PSNP programme. In this scheme, the PSNP has a risk financing mechanism (contingency funds) so that when a shock occurs, income-generating activities and public works can be initiated to ensure access to food. The Government of Ethiopia, with the creation of the contingency funds within the social safety net programme, has successfully integrated development (for chronically food-insecure households) and emergency interventions in rural areas. Risk financing mechanisms allow non-PSNP beneficiaries in the PSNP woredas to benefit extraordinarily from the programme in times of shock.

It is the duty of the DRM directorate to monitor and give drought early warnings, but it is the PSNP that will work jointly with the DRM in case of drought, by scaling-up transfers (i.e. giving larger transfers or including non-PSNP beneficiaries using the contingency fund) to assist recipients in adapting to the

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13 Under the current design, non-PSNP woredas do not have this contingency mechanism and have to be catered to by ad hoc emergency mechanisms.
shock of the drought.

As an example of success, two respondents from the World Bank and Save the Children pointed out the resilience showed by PSNP households in the ongoing drought that has hit the Horn of Africa. Unlike in Kenya and Somalia, the drought has not led to famine or destitution, but to a need for upscaling PSNP efforts (using contingency funds). People have managed to maintain their livelihoods.

In Ethiopia, two main factors can be considered to have contributed to strengthening the food security programme and the disaster risk management coordination mechanisms: (1) resources channelled through these bodies (and therefore the relevance of decision-making in the allocation of funds); and (2) specialized staff appointed to support coordination processes. However, coordination is reduced to those ministries directly involved in the implementation activities (i.e. MoARD as the responsible body, MOFED for transfers, Ministry of Water and Ministry of Roads for Public Works). There is no coordination with other bodies in terms of broadening the understanding of food security beyond food access, for example with the Ministry of Health regarding nutrition, or the Ministry of Water regarding hygiene and sanitation.

Another important debate related to the effectiveness of FSN architectures is about the capacity of the FSN coordination mechanisms to put multi/intersectorality into practice, and to overcome resistance on the part of the ministries in accrediting them. According to some informants in Brazil who were discussing CONSEA and CAISAN:

*The Executive Secretaries of these agencies [CONSEA and CAISAN] really believe in intersectorality, whereas Ministers still remain a little distrustful and worried about losing agendas. This is because there are agenda disputes and concerns about the loss of thematic priorities at each Ministry.*

Sectoral distrust can be aggravated when coordination mechanisms exceed their coordinating role and become directly involved in implementing activities. For example, some informants in Mozambique mentioned that SETSAN aspires to be an implementing actor within the Ministry of Agriculture, competing with the role of line ministries. This situation also has been an issue in the case of institutional frameworks that directly depend on Presidential Cabinets (e.g. the Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire - CSA in Mali or the Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional - Food and Nutrition Security Secretariat in Guatemala) (see Box 3).

**Box 3. Food Security Commissariat in Mali**

In 2002, the Government of Mali started an FSN institutional framework, characterized by the adoption of a National FSN Strategy (2002), the creation of a Food Security Commissariat (FSC) (2004) – attached to the Presidency – and the adoption of a National FSN Programme (2005). In 2010, an FSN institutional framework assessment showed important limitations in the effectiveness of this institutional framework, and one of the main arguments highlighted was related to the CSA institutional dependency.

On the one hand, an FSC directly linked to the Presidency was a sign of political support, facilitating access to resources. But on the other hand, the Presidency of the Republic is not an executing body; however, it was perceived as a ministry because it has directly executed projects in different regions of the country. This situation complicated the relationships with line ministries.
Moreover, the FSC is not directly under the authority of the Prime Ministry, Chief of the Government, and therefore the position as a “super-structure” at the Presidential level does not facilitate coordination and administrative action.

Finally, the FSC was created by Presidential Decree, not really anchored to other legislative or administrative procedures. As in the case of other previous presidential decrees (e.g. the decentralized mission in Mali), once political support to the FSN at the Presidential level dies out, the institutional framework vanishes.

Institutional structures designed to coordinate FSN policies and avoid duplication of efforts are needed, and in general they have proved to be effective. Although the debates around levels of administrative dependency persist, this might not be such a fundamental argument to ensure FSN framework effectiveness, particularly if coordinating structures are able to overcome line-ministry resistance. Line ministries can convey trust, accreditation and support for governance structures if coordinating structures:

- do not behave as implementing institutions;
- have strong political support and a clear mandate/role in decision-making (supra-sectoral level);
- contribute to conveying sectoral voices and demands at a high political level; and
- facilitate timely and relevant information for evidence-based decision-making.

3.3.2. Key variables for analysing FSN institutional architectures

The experiences described in previous sections (e.g. Peru) show that key factors of success are related to providing coordination schemes among different ministries, with an important role for civil society in the definition of policies, the relevance of decentralization (i.e. the national government is no longer considered to be the sole provider of services) and a strong results-based management system.

The Ethiopian experience also explains the importance of monitoring and accountability of results, and the relevance of institutional decentralization in FSN frameworks. The construction of effective decentralization systems in Ethiopia has definitively contributed to the coordination among different government levels. Sometimes, a cabinet-level unit secures coordination at a high political level, but participation in operational and technical levels is not well-balanced. Also, effective programme implementation requires clear lines of authority and communication to lower-level implementers and the creation of bodies responsible for programme implementation. FSN decentralization processes are crucial to make FSN policies more effective (see Box 4).
Box 4. Institutional architecture for effective decentralization in Ethiopia

There is a significant degree of administrative decentralization in Ethiopia. Most policies have to be progressively decentralized from the federal level to the regional/state level to the zonal level (if applicable) and to the woreda and kebele levels. Financial flows and decision-making are channelled through these decentralized administrations, and therefore the performance of federal programmes depends on the capacity of these decentralized agencies to deliver them. For example, impacts of the PSNP programme on food security outcomes depend directly on the capacity of MOFED regional and subregional financial offices (the Regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development and Woreda Office for Finance and Economic Development (WOFED)) to deliver cash transfers on time.\(^{14}\) Since their capacity to do so has varied over time and in different regions, there have been diverse results of the impact on food security indicators evident in the PSNP impact assessments.

Ethiopia’s food security coordinating structures at a decentralized level have an important role in the implementation of policies and programmes. Regional Food Security Bureaus decide where public works are carried out, and they allocate resources to woredas. At the woreda level, there is a Food Security Steering Committee that coordinates the main FSN programmes, such as the PSNP and the HABP. This committee includes elected woreda officers of agriculture, water, health, education and women’s affairs, covering strategic issues and general oversight of food security programmes. For more practical implementation matters, there is a Food Security Task Force that includes expert/technical staff. Woredas are responsible for answering appeals made at the kebele level and delivering transfers in a timely manner. The woreda is also responsible for mobilizing contingency funds if a drought is declared. At the kebele and community levels, beneficiary lists are selected and appeals (normally by graduates who believe they should continue in the programme) are processed.

Clear directives by departments from the federal level to the woreda level guide the extensionists and health workers. Stakeholders involved in the national study spoke of the important coordination functions that occur at the woreda level among different offices/departments. The physical proximity (i.e. sharing offices and meetings at the woreda council or in the field in kebeles) allows officers and extensionists to be aware of others’ functions. Officers exchange a lot of knowledge about the programmes, and the woreda meetings (strategic and technical), including those on food security, include members from Health, Education, Water and Women’s Affairs, among other areas. Similarly, at the kebele level, three development agents (agricultural extensionists) work shoulder-to-shoulder with two health extensionists, and these extensionists are aware of each other’s work.

Brazil’s experience shows the results of a process of constructing a National System of Food Security and Nutrition (SISAN) with institutions supported by legal mechanisms that provide a robust intra-governmental coordination scheme for implementing FSN policies. It also shows the importance of defining supra-sectoral development objectives linked to FSN and a monitoring system that facilitates the transparency and accountability of programmes and that feeds the process of decision-making. Joint and coordinated activities between the government and civil society are a characteristic of FSN policies and institutions and should be considered one of the bases of the construction of FSN institutional architectures. Box 5 summarizes these characteristics to explain how this national FSN system works.

\(^{14}\) Originally the PSNP envisaged the MoARD taking over the financial side of the PSNP as well, but some donors felt that it was more useful in the long term to develop the capacity of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development in financial management.
Box 5. Constructing a national system for FSN in Brazil

The National System of Food Security and Nutrition (SISAN) is the central institutional framework for implementing FSN policies in Brazil. It was established by the Organic Law on Food and Nutrition Security (LOSAN) in 2006. SISAN is a public system (still in process) that facilitates intersectoral, participatory and coordinated management among federal agencies in order to implement policies that promote food security and nutrition; it aims to optimize the perspectives and potentialities within each sector. SISAN is a systemic and intersectoral system that integrates the three governmental levels (i.e. federal, state, municipal), and includes social participation as a constituting element for formulating, implementing and monitoring the policy and the system. Guided by a supra-sectoral political conception, it transfers a decisive role to the respective coordinating mechanisms or entities, reaches agreements and achieves conciliation on different sectoral approaches and interests.

National System for Food and Nutrition Security - LOSAN

Among the different institutional structures of this system, there are two unique bodies that have proven to be successful in constructing an intersectoral and comprehensive FSN policy: The National Food Security and Nutrition Conference (CNSAN) and the National Council for Food Security and Nutrition (CONSEA).

CONSEA is viewed as one of the most active councils with a number of unique characteristics. One of these is that a representative of civil society holds the presidency and plays a consultative and advisory role for the President of the Brazilian Republic in formulating policies and guidelines to enable Brazil to enforce the RTF (even suggesting various budgetary allocation programmes and proposals to the President and other ministries). It has also acquired political legitimacy because of the level of priority...
given to FSN by the Government, and by the fact that the President of Brazil has put proposals made by the council into effect (though not all have been contemplated), as evidenced by the approval of LOSAN and the implementation of programmes such as the National School Feeding Programme and the Food Purchase Programme.

Among the permanent activities of CONSEA is the organization of national FSN conferences every four years to provide CONSEA with guidelines and priorities. The national conference is preceded by state- and municipal-level conferences, from which delegates are chosen for representation at the national level.

CONSEA has succeeded in pushing this process forward by engaging with other sectors, encouraging intersectoral dialogue, providing the space for wide representation of interests in Brazilian society and orienting FSN policies. Another institutional structure within the SISAN, the Interministerial Food and Nutrition Security Chamber (CAISAN), is going through a consolidation process and is beginning to perceive that intersectoral management is not just about seeking interfaces between line ministries, but about coordinating this interface.

From the analysis, a number of variables have been identified to compare FSN institutional architectures. Through these variables, it is possible to characterize different organizational frameworks to coordinate FSN policies and programmes. Six main variables have been identified in this stocktaking exercise that will be applied for mapping FSN institutional frameworks:

1. provision of interministerial coordination schemes for FSN;
2. creation of institutional spaces representing civil society’s interests and demands;
3. endowment of legally supported mechanisms;
4. existence of effective decentralized systems for FSN coordination at local levels;
5. focus on supra-sectoral FSN objectives (e.g. economic development, poverty, inequity) further than sectoral objectives (e.g. productivity, nutrition) as a result of coordination among different sectors; and
6. mechanisms to monitor progress using results-based management systems, to mainstream FSN indicators at sectoral levels and to ensure that the FSN situation is regularly assessed in order to provide accurate information on problems and needs (information systems in the broad sense).

3.3.3. Mapping FSN institutional architectures

The studied countries take different approaches in their institutional frameworks for FSN in relation to these variables.¹⁵

Brazil shows a more complete institutional scheme, in which most of the identified variables are taken into account. The Brazilian FSN national system is the result of a long-standing intersectorial and systemic process; it integrates three governmental levels, serves as the basis for a significant degree of decentralization of public policies and includes social participation as a constituent element for formulating, implementing and monitoring the policy and the system as a whole (Maluf, 2010). Such a systemic approach needs time to develop and consolidate; policies implemented in Brazil have arisen from historical social mobilizations and capacity-building processes, as well as favourable conditions in terms of policy design, implementation and consolidation.

¹⁵ Further analysis of these variables can be found in Annex 6.
Social participation has been instrumental in changing the paradigm described above. “All of the gains obtained within the FSN policy through institutionality must be observed in accordance with mobilization and social organization processes,” affirmed one of the informants in Brazil. Since the mid-1980s, after 20 years of military dictatorship, there has been an intense social mobilization process marked by the subsequent development of proposals for dealing with social issues, including food and nutrition. It is within this context, regulated by the activities of civil society organizations, that FSN has assumed a progressive relevance for government agendas.

However, there is still a great deal of centrality and vertical integration when it comes to national policies. Qualification of staff in municipal management roles is essential in order to guarantee the effective implementation of FSN public policies. Still, there is much expectation in Brazil as to how the policies contained in the current FSN National Plan, comprising SISAN, will be coordinated and implemented, particularly in terms of the involvement of local entities at the municipal and state levels.

Although it is difficult to define commonalities in the design and implementation of FSN frameworks among different countries, it is possible to find some characteristics shared in some of the cases. For example, Bangladesh, Guatemala and Mozambique present well-designed and balanced institutional structures, where most of the coordination issues are contemplated (and even sometimes legally supported) and theoretical components of FSN (e.g. availability, access, utilization) are frequently part of the institutional frameworks. Another common feature is that the FSN institutional architecture is basically centralized with weak linkages between local and central governments. The participation of different line ministries is facilitated through a technical council which mainly focuses on the implementation of FSN strategies or national FSN programmes and monitoring food insecurity and vulnerability in the country. Sometimes, this framing restricts its action to technical discussions; the policy framework is weak which results in a limited political coordination role. Civil society plays a secondary role in coordination because civil society organizations working in this area are still weak and participate in the process only when required. In practice, these institutional architectures have not been very dynamic, and the engagement of line ministries is scarce and uneven.

Other countries do not have comprehensive FSN coordination structures, but institutional arrangements for effective coordination of sectoral policies for FSN are in place. Sectoral schemes often count on resources from national budgets (“Oportunidades” programme in Mexico) and donor support (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in Ethiopia) and are implemented through flagship programmes. Management systems and well-defined indicators are priorities for monitoring policy actions. As evidenced in Ethiopia and Mexico, one of the attributes of this approach is its pragmatism, i.e. being able to adapt sectoral institutional mechanisms for the delivery of effective programmes. These sectoral approaches provide space for the participation of civil society and development partners, and can be supported by decentralized frameworks for implementation at local levels (e.g. PRSP in Ethiopia or the Special Programme for Food Security (PESA) in Mexico). Lack of intersectoral coordination means, however, that agricultural programmes are implemented independently from social and nutrition programmes.

In the case of the MoARD institutional architecture in Ethiopia, it has been possible to create synergies among different FSN policies based on sectoral approaches: emergency response

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16 For specific reference to the case of Guatemala see Box 8.
and social safety nets; social safety nets and asset building programmes; and agricultural growth and food security. In its design, the nutrition programme adequately complements the food security programme, although this synergy does not occur in practice. However, FSN coordination is strongly decentralized at ground levels (i.e. woreda and kebele levels), where there is significant interaction among the different offices (e.g. education, health, food security, women’s affairs extension) and there is therefore a greater potential for synergetic work.

3.4. FSN legal frameworks

3.4.1. Regulatory frameworks for FSN coordination mechanisms

The analysis of the four countries demonstrates that, in general terms (excluding the case of Brazil), FSN institutional frameworks were not formed on regulatory bases, or if these existed, normative foundations remain weak. Regulatory frameworks for FSN coordination do not exist in Bangladesh or Ethiopia. In Mozambique, a recent decree has formally approved the role of SETSAN, providing resources, enhancing SETSAN’s coordination role and improving the relationship with line ministries (see Box 6). In Ethiopia, important deficiencies have been detected in FSN policy dialogue among line ministries; sectoral policy documents make few references to a comprehensive FSN approach; and linkages among nutrition, education and agriculture are very weak.

Box 6. Upgrading and providing legal support and administrative autonomy to coordinating structures within line ministries in Mozambique

In Mozambique, the institutional structure responsible for coordinating FSN actions is the Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security (SETSAN). Although it was created in 1998, it did not have legal support until 2010, when it was formally established through the adoption of Decree No. 24/2010. Before its legal formalization, SETSAN depended on the National Directorate of Agricultural Services (DNSA) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI). SETSAN had a low bureaucratic profile in the administrative structures and, therefore, encountered difficulties in coordinating and providing policy advice on FSN and programme implementation.

With Decree 24/2010, SETSAN remains under the purview of the MINAGRI, although it has gained the status of public institutions with more administrative autonomy. Now, human and financial resources have been allocated to SETSAN, and it has its own budget line in the National Budget. It is expected that legal support and administrative autonomy will contribute to improving the coordinating role of SETSAN, providing substantial spaces for dialogue on FSN policy and reinforcing the effective implementation of FSN strategy through line ministries. The new statutes remain up for approval, but it is generally considered that the current institutional arrangement will be maintained, with the exception of upgrading SETSAN within the MINAGRI.

In Brazil, regulatory provisions are basic actions to ensure the effective coordination and implementation of FSN policies, plans and programmes. Evidence of the relevance of this approach comes through the existence of an FSN Organic Law (LOSAN) that enforces the RtF and establishes SISAN and other coordinating arrangements.

Because the four countries studied accord different relevance to the regulation of institutions for coordinating FSN, it is pertinent to ask the following questions: Why are legal and regulatory provisions needed for institutional frameworks for food security? Analysing the Brazilian experience, it is possible to provide some inputs that might offer answers to these
questions:

- FSN needs to be approached as a cross-cutting issue with mechanisms that promote multisectoral dialogue. Coordinating actions among different sectors of the public administration and with civil society involves a complex process of articulation and negotiation among sectoral policy systems. Dynamics of this approach are complex, and without formal regulatory coordination mechanisms it would be difficult to share objectives, goals and resources.

- Spaces for dialogue and negotiation among line ministries responsible for planning and implementing FSN policies are required, and legal regulation of these spaces makes participation compulsory among line ministries. This would contribute to the internalization of the FSN results framework and the accreditation and ownership of FSN institutional frameworks within line ministries. Regulating institutional frameworks for FSN also avoids duplication of structures dealing with FSN issues.

- Legal regulation of FSN coordinating structures can provide clearer mandates and better decision-making powers, ensuring spaces for effective planning and monitoring and channelling the needed resources. This would allow for effective availability of resources to implement political compromises, engender better accountability and make institutional frameworks a more effective mechanism in monitoring implementation of FSN at sectoral levels. Regulation can also contribute to the budget approval needed for coordination (staff and activities). For example, regulation supporting the creation of differentiated FSN policy coordination mechanisms in Brazil has had a positive impact in terms of fully clarifying and defining the current role of the different institutions. Before the existence of CAISAN, government sectors used CONSEA areas to hold meetings in order to understand and resolve internal issues. Ministry representatives can now fulfil their objectives within CAISAN. In turn, CONSEA’s role and activities are now better defined.

- Legally approved institutional frameworks contribute to the sustainability of institutional arrangements (i.e. greater sustainability is provided through laws than through decrees). For example, in Brazil, CONSEA was created by Decree in 2003, but LOSAN has more guarantees to be sustained over time.

- Regulation also provides the necessary space for intersectoral action. If a sectoral programme needs to incorporate issues that compete with other sectors, a regulated institutional framework provides space for the development of different perspectives.

- Finally, legal frameworks for intersectoral action can provide the space needed for political action, regulating the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination and others (e.g. the adoption of the RtF).

3.4.2. Existing legal provisions for consideration of the RtF

Bangladesh, Brazil and Ethiopia have ratified and incorporated into their national legislations the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Of the study countries, only Mozambique has not ratified the ICESCR. None of the four countries has signed the Convention’s Optional Protocol, adopted in December 2008, which allows its parties to recognize the competence of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to consider complaints from individuals (this Protocol will not be entered into force until 10 countries have ratified it, and currently, seven countries have done so). The signature and
ratification of the ICESCR implies the obligation of the states to responsibly uphold these rights, including the RtF.

The incorporation of the human RtF into national constitutions and legislation is considered to be a fundamental step towards the effective realization of these rights at the national level. Recognition of the RtF in a country’s constitution can be accomplished in different ways:

- explicit or direct recognition as a human right in itself, or as part of a wider human right;
- implicit recognition through the inclusion of other human rights; or
- recognition as a constitutional principle or guideline.

These means of recognizing the RtF serve as a basis for comparing countries on their level of consideration for the RtF (see Table 6). Among the countries analysed, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Brazil recognize the RtF in their constitutions:

- Ethiopia explicitly recognizes the RtF in its constitution. Article 90.1 states (under ‘social objectives’): “Every Ethiopian shall be entitled, within the limits of the country’s resources, to food, clean water, shelter, health, education and security of pension”.
- In Bangladesh there is an explicit recognition in Article 15 of its constitution, elaborating the responsibility of the state to secure the provision of basic needs to its citizens, including food: “It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to attain, through planned economic growth, a constant increase of productive forces and a steady improvement of the material and cultural standard of living of the people, with a view to securing to its citizens... the provision of the basic necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care”.

However, policies and programmes for FSN in Ethiopia and Bangladesh do not explicitly echo the legal recognition of the RtF, and RtF is not a term generally used in their formulation. Thus, recognition of RtF in the carta magna does not guarantee that RtF approaches are prioritized in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes for FSN.

The case of Brazil is different, because food is legally considered as a right in most legislative dimensions. Amendment nº 64 of the Federal Constitution, Article nº 6 was approved in February 2010, and this stated that food is explicitly considered as a right among other social rights. Brazil’s federal state obligation to protect and promote RtF is also explicitly detailed in other important regulations, and it has been mainstreamed in FSN policies and institutions. This can be seen in the law that created CONSEA (2003) and in LOSAN (2006). Article 2 of LOSAN requires the state to adopt the necessary policies and actions for the realization of the RtF:

> Access to adequate food is an essential human right, inherent to human dignity and indispensable towards the realization of other consecrated rights at Federal Constitution level, it therefore being the duty of public authorities to adopt policies and activities that are necessary for promoting and ensuring food security and nutrition for their respective populations.

Section 2 of LOSAN also explains the responsibility “… of the relevant public authorities to respect, protect, promote, provide, inform, monitor, supervise and evaluate correct fulfilment of the human right to receive adequate food, as well as making sure that mechanisms are fully in place for ensuring its enforceability”.

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Finally, most Brazilian laws and policies already include the RtF. Some interesting examples are:

- the Law on Basic Citizen Income no. 10.835 of 2004, which establishes the basic income that corresponds to the minimum necessary amount for every Brazilian living in the country in order to live in dignity with proper quantities of food as a right;
- the Decree for Traditional Peoples and Communities no. 6.040 of 2007, which establishes the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Traditional Peoples and Communities, including food security and nutrition as a fundamental traditional peoples’ right;
- the Law on School Food Programme no. 11.947 of 2009, which establishes school food as a basic right for students within the state education system; and
- other laws, including the Consumer Code (Law 8.078 of 1999); the Child and Adolescent Statute (Law no. 8.069 of 1990), establishing the human RtF for adolescents and children as an absolute priority; and the Statute of the Elderly (Law no. 10.741 of 2003).

In Mozambique, the recognition of the RtF in the Constitution is only implicit, because in the *carta magna* there are references to other economic, social and cultural rights. Recent efforts supported by FAO to draft an RtF law shows that the RtF approach is weakly implemented through general policies and plans.\(^{17}\) RtF is only explicitly mentioned in the FSN definition in the ESAN II, approved in 2007, but this is just a reference for policies and has no legal implication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ratified the ICESCR though legislative decree 591/92 on 6 July 1992</td>
<td>ICESCR not signed</td>
<td>Ratified the ICESCR in June 1993</td>
<td>Ratified the ICESCR in 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RtF is explicitly recognized through Constitutional amendment (art. 6) in February 2010</td>
<td>RtF is implicitly recognized through the inclusion of other related rights (children’s, elderly persons and disabled people’s rights), as well as fundamental principles in which this right can be included</td>
<td>The Ethiopian constitution explicitly recognized entitlements to food in article 90.1 (1995)</td>
<td>The Constitution of Bangladesh explicitly recognizes RtF as a State responsibility (art.15)</td>
</tr>
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However, the analysis of the experiences in the four countries reflect that references to the right to food in the Carta magna or in policies, strategies and programmes does not affect the effective adoption of right to food approaches if no support is provided through organic and sectoral laws for FSN.

\(^{17}\) RtF is not considered in the main strategies of the country, specifically in the National Strategic HIV/AIDS Response Plan (PEN III), the Multisectoral Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Undernutrition (PAMRDC), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2010-2015 (PARP) and the Strategy Plan for Agrarian Sector Development (PEDSA).
3.4.3. Regulatory frameworks for FSN policies and programmes

In Brazil and Mozambique there is formal recognition by regulatory means of FSN policies, strategies and plans. In Brazil, there are specific norms that clearly define the National Policy for Food Security and Nutrition – PNSAN (Decree no. 7.272 of 25th August 2010) and its implementation process through the National Food and Nutrition Plan (PNAN) (Decree no. 2.715, of 17 November 2011). The approval by law of the PNSAN provides a detailed description of 7 core guidelines and 25 programmes that are to be implemented. Formally, the process of revising the PNSAN (and any subsequent versions) was also established, to take place every two years based on guidelines supplied by CAISAN.

In Mozambique, the ESAN/PASAN II strategy is also legally defined (Decree 56 of December 2007) and supported through the legal definition of SETSAN in 2010. This has contributed to the development of a number of actions in ministries that retain the greatest responsibilities for the implementation of ESAN II (i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture, Women and Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Health), although their efforts do not fully converge. The recent adoption of PAMRDC has complemented ESAN/PASAN II with respect to the health and nutrition components, and there is high expectation regarding this plan, but no formal regulation supports the actions agreed in it.

In Ethiopia, no reference has been found that describes a regulatory framework articulating norms of FSN policies, strategies, plans or programmes, or through which it is possible to hold FSN policies and programmes accountable.

A common procedure in “legislation” of FSN policies just consists of adopting and endorsing FSN policies and programmes by parliaments. However, endorsement by parliaments of these policy instruments does not have a legal effect, and frequently it is a mere formal procedure with no implications for the implementation of the policy. For instance, the Bangladesh National Food Policy (including the Food Planning and Monitoring Committee) has been endorsed by the Parliament, but there is no legal regulation providing sustained and longstanding support between government periods. The Bangladesh country assessment showed that the perception of the FSN Thematic Teams (i.e. specialized interministerial bodies led by the Food Planning and Monitoring Unit that focuses on each dimension of food security and facilitates cross-sectoral collaboration) is that the internalization of the FSN results framework in the different sectors was weak at the time of the report.18

The weak regulatory frameworks that support coordinating structures and FSN policy instruments bring to the fore the limited roles that legislative and judicial bodies play in designing FSN institutional frameworks and implementing FSN policies; they are too frequently clustered in executive powers and are, therefore, seen as governmental and not state policies. The experiences in providing capacity-building and access to information for parliamentarians (see references on Parliamentary Front against Hunger in Box 7) have definitively contributed to improving parliament powers and their role in FSN legislation.

Legislative powers have a main role in the elaboration, modification and approval of laws, but they also have an important role in the budget governance, which, by assigning enough resources for the effective approval and implementation of FSN policies, is needed for

18 The country study showed that the perception of FAO staff in this country is that even the health sector does not fully integrate nutrition issues.
sustained public actions. Box 7 provides some inputs about this role of legislative powers in FSN frameworks.

**Box 7. Legislative powers and budget governance for FSN frameworks**

Legislative powers play a very important role in keeping executive powers accountable for the way in which they use public resources. Legislative chambers approve budgets, authorize governments to raise revenues, spend on government institutional architecture and service delivery (i.e. for specific social programmes) and analyse audited accounts, verifying whether governments have delivered on budget promises. They play a key role in approving institutional reforms, ensuring and amending the allocation of funds for FSN programmes and holding government policies and strategies accountable.

Parliament’s effectiveness in “budget governance” depends on institutional and political factors, but also on the capacities of its members. Institutional factors are related to the presidential or parliamentary nature of the country and amendment powers for laws and budget proposals submitted by the executive. Political factors are related to the diversity of parties that compose the government, and the situation of dominance among the different parties. As institutional and political factors are diverse, FSN frameworks will be developed in different forms depending on the existing institutional and political landscapes (Wehner, 2004).

The balance of power defined by institutional and political schemes, the capacities of parliamentarians, and access to information determines the significance of the intervention of legislative powers in the budget process. Any change in the roles of legislative and executive powers will need relevant legal (constitutional) changes, but a lot could be done to improve parliamentarians’ access to information and training to engage in the formulation, adoption, oversight and control of the budget. Particular improvements can be made to their engagement in the allocation of resources for social policies and programmes.

Capacity-building and information access can definitively contribute, in that parliamentarians can better exercise their budgetary powers and adopt legislation to secure and advance efforts in the fight against hunger. In this regard, initiatives such as the Parliamentary Front against Hunger (PFH) in Latin America have been designed to involve parliaments in positioning hunger eradication efforts as part of the public agenda, to provide the legal, institutional and financial structures necessary for success, to monitor the funding assigned and to confirm that funds are being spent in accordance with policies promoted by the executive powers.

However, the role of parliaments in FSN frameworks is not only a question of balance of power, capacities and information access, but also a question of understanding incentive structures characterized by patronage politics and weak political parties, in which congress/parliament members are more interested in responding to their constituencies than focusing on legislating or policy-making (this is mostly the case in African countries). As described by Rackner in the case of Malawi, formal rules and procedures are considered to be theatre or a façade where, in reality, informal practices predominate. These practices determine the way in which budget resources are actually distributed, and which reflect the clientelist nature of the country’s political system (Rachner, 2004). In this sense, international organizations and donors needs to better understand the political economy factors that influence certain behaviours and informal politics that underlie political decisions and enhance work with constituencies at the territorial level.

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19 Budget governance refers to the quality of budget outcomes, such as the governments’ ability to produce sustainable public finances over time, make efficient use of government spending and represent the preferences of citizens (Mejia and De Renzio, 2008).
3.4.4 FSN legal frameworks are not a panacea

Legal and regulatory frameworks contribute to normative, administrative and institutional support of FSN institutions, clarifying their role and facilitating formal spaces for the formulation and implementation of FSN policies. Laws and decrees also provide the legal support for FSN policies and plans. Based on the previous sections in this chapter, it might be understood that FSN legal frameworks are essentially the answer to the challenge of weak FSN frameworks.

However, regulations essentially provide legal support for a process of constructing FSN policies and institutions. If political support for policies and institutions is weak, legitimacy in the construction of norms is poor (e.g. programmes developed without the participation of the civil society). In these cases, the FSN process is unlikely to be maintained over time, and regulations will not be effective. Sometimes, actions based on political leadership initiatives without the process of consensus generate weak institutions with a debilitated role in the construction and implementation of effective policies (Garcia, 2010).

In this regard, Box 8 explains the case of Guatemala, in which an impressive FSN regulatory framework was created in 2005, but where FSN outcomes have deteriorated in the last five years and remain among the worst in Latin America.

Box 8. Not only regulatory frameworks: the case of Guatemala

In 2005, Guatemala approved legislative Decree nº 32-2005, establishing and defining the role of the FSN national system and the FSN Secretary of the Presidency. At that stage, government officials and international organizations congratulated Guatemala on the process and the implications of this regulatory action, forwarding discourses such as: “FSN is now considered as a State Policy not the action of a specific government [...] incorporating the coordination of FSN actions at decentralized level and FSN information systems where FSN is defined as a human right. [...] Guatemala is one of the few countries in the world that incorporates the Right to Food in its legal regulations” (GIISAN, 2005).

Indeed, with the approval of Decree 32-2005, Guatemala provided an impressive regulatory framework for the creation of an FSN National System (SINASAN) considered “a strategic organizing and coordinating institutional framework to prioritize, design and implement FSN plans and actions”. SINASAN was constituted by the FSN National Council – CONASAN (coordinating interministerial body), the FSN Secretary – SESAN (operating the national food security and nutrition plan (PSAN)), and two other consultative bodies: the Social Consultative Group – INCOPAS (civil society) and the Institutional Supporting Group – GIA (other government actors and donors).

Despite this completed legal framework, the latest reports from UN organizations indicate that Guatemalan children suffer from some of the highest malnutrition and stunting rates in the world. As stated in The Lancet, “among Latin American countries, Guatemala is the only one to have failed to decrease its malnutrition over the past decade—even countries with worse income inequality [...] have had much bigger successes in addressing the problem” (Loevenberg, 2009: 187-189).

Analysing 19 of the most relevant FSN programmes, a recent evaluation of the Guatemalan FSN Secretary-SESAN shows that only 26 percent are integrated in SESAN and are considered in the PSAN. It also states that there is no inter-institutional coordination, and planning systems are very weak. The reported FSN programmes only accounted for 2 percent of the 2010 National Budget and 0.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (SESAN, 2011). Previous figures show that FSN institutions still play only a marginal role.

Of course, in Guatemala the reasons for chronic malnutrition can be attributed to factors such as stark income inequality; lack of education; increased prices of basic food staples; non-existent infrastructure;
poverty; and a highly dysfunctional society where other factors such as insecurity and corruption are deeply entrenched. However, these other factors should be considered when a complex system of regulatory frameworks has been constructed with so little funding and policy/institutional influence.

Some authors argue that in Guatemala the food insecurity situation reflects a problem of political will (Loevenberg, 2009: 188). Analysing the construction of the FSN regulatory frameworks, it is important also to reflect on some other factors of the process that might have intervened in the construction of a weak FSN regulatory framework:

- an accelerated process of construction of the FSN regulatory framework, responding to particular political interests of individuals who were not encompassed by the policy and institutional processes, which need time to reach consensus on state questions and to assimilate changes;
- a lack of understanding of norms and values that exist within line ministries that angle policy and action through a sectoral perspective;
- a limited open policy dialogue on FSN issues with and among the representatives of the most affected areas and population, accompanied by a narrow, non-decentralized consultative process;
- a weak representation of civil society in the construction of the regulatory frameworks and lack of consideration of the issues that were a priority for them in terms of FSN (e.g. access to land), which eroded the legitimacy of FSN institutions; and
- a lack of understanding of the process of construction of an FSN framework in mass media, academia and civil society (e.g. religious constituencies, private sector).

As such, regulatory frameworks for FSN are not a panacea; depending on the circumstances, legal support might be nothing but a “façade”, and may even be counterproductive because actions rely on legally-constituted institutions that are weak and have no real effectiveness.

4. The role of donors and international organizations

Since the World Food Summit in 1996 and the Millennium Conference in 2000 where specific goals to fight against hunger were defined, most countries have developed FSN policies, strategies, plans or programmes focused on achieving those goals. General recognition of FSN as a cross-cutting issue has contributed to the construction of FSN institutional frameworks focused on coordinating, harmonizing and monitoring actions through multisectoral or intersectoral approaches and trying to improve the effectiveness of actions at the sectoral level.

International organizations and donors have unconditionally supported the promotion of cross-cutting FSN policies, plans and programmes and the construction of FSN institutional architectures. Results from investments and technical support often have been measured by the number of FSN programmes approved, FSN policies in process, FSN councils and committees created and other quantitative assessments that do not necessarily correlate with advances in FSN national outcomes (e.g. in Guatemala and Mozambique). Experience suggests that not all countries should necessarily prioritize national FSN programmes or specific FSN councils/bodies (when, for example, there is a flagship programme already addressing questions of nutrition or food production). There is also evidence that FSN policies can effectively work without the construction of FSN intersectoral organizational frameworks (e.g. as in Ethiopia).
Sometimes this “supporter role” has resulted in what De Renzio refers as to as “big bang approaches”, which means that international organizations and donors emphasize “introducing a number of reforms at the same time, without giving due attention to sequencing matters or to political and technical feasibility, and underlying factors determining government willingness to embark in different reforms have not been sufficiently understood by supporting agencies” (De Renzio, 2006:633). This approach is particularly ineffective when capacities within recipient governments are reduced to managing complex institutional reforms, like the ones required for the construction of FSN frameworks.

Indeed, when international organizations and/or donors promote FSN approaches that do not fit with the political, institutional and technical conditions of the target country, efforts, resources and technical assistance become scattered. It is therefore important to understand the wide range of approaches to FSN institutional frameworks in order to identify the ways in which the political, technical and legislative actions should be focused. If a country like Ethiopia, for example, bases its development strategy on agricultural development, prioritizes reaching CAADP compromises and focuses its donors’ actions on sectoral support, it might be more effective to contribute to an FSN institutional framework starting from a sectoral approach and then supporting awareness actions to enhance other sectors involved in FSN. This is also the case with other countries in Africa, which prioritize resources and political support to sectoral approaches in agriculture and rural development in order to achieve the commitments adopted in CAADP compacts.

On the other hand, supportive approaches through coordinating efforts among agencies have produced excellent results. One example is the Peruvian Child Nutrition Initiative (CNI), an advocacy coalition integrated by several agencies, which has played a guiding role in reminding the government of Peru to reduce malnutrition and in monitoring its efforts in this area (see Box 9). Another successful example is the case of Bangladesh, where under joint effort of the Government and development partners -USAID and EU on donor’s side, IFPRI and FAO on the technical side- allowed to produce the first country investment plan in 2010 and the updated version in 2011, setting the basis for a full harmonization of the national food security framework, allowing the Government to adopt the same approach for food security in the Sixth Five Year Plan. The Results Framework of the SFYP integrates the same food security impact indicators that are used in the National Food Policy Plan of Action and in the CIP – which cover the nutrition dimension. In such framework, nutritional wellbeing is considered as the only sufficient condition for food security.

This type of coalition was also implemented in 2003 in Ethiopia with the Coalition for Food Security to coordinate and harmonize the work of development partners in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda. In Ethiopia, donors agreed through the PSNP to a set of guiding principles and donor coordination processes, and these were documented in a Memorandum of Understanding. This created a donor forum where donors establish common positions, policies and mechanisms for government engagement. Donors adopted a single monitoring system and a common financial management and procurement framework. This proved essential to improving effectiveness and reducing transaction costs.

Box 9. Successful coordination efforts between government and non-government agencies: The Child Nutrition Initiative in Peru

Peru has experienced success in fighting malnutrition through coordination and resource allocation. One of the salient features of the Peruvian success story is the fundamental role played by the
international aid system and civil society organizations in forming the Child Nutrition Initiative (CNI) in early 2006. It was created to accompany Peruvian Government efforts to reduce malnutrition, promoting good policies beyond nutrition by working across different policy sectors including health, education, housing and public finance.

The CNI is an advocacy coalition integrated by agencies (mainly international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donors) that had been actively working to reduce Peru’s child malnutrition: Action Against Hunger, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), CARE, CARITAS, Plan International, PRISMA, Future Generations, Institute of Nutritional Research, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Population Fund, Panamerican Health Organization (PAHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It works closely with other coordination mechanisms such as the Concertation Group for Fighting Poverty (Mesa de Concertación para la Lucha contra la Pobreza - MCLCP). With no legal status, CNI is governed by a Board of Directors and is composed of technical and communication committees.

According to its members, CNI was focused on finding common and complementary approaches to fight against malnutrition through a wider understanding of what really works, to overcome the fragmentation of multiple government sectors and to make sure that government strategies reached the lowest household-level of beneficiaries. In reality, and according to Mejia, CNI was considered “a sort of ‘Jiminy Cricket’, a sort of ‘advocacy conscience’ that reminded, guided and monitored government commitment to reducing malnutrition”. In this sense, CNI effectively lobbied the government to prioritize the allocation of resources and formation of policy around proven actions and sound strategies against chronic child malnutrition. CNI mainly focused on:

- establishing an informal coordination mechanism to channel technical and financial contributions from different cooperation agencies;
- advocating to make nutrition the central component of the government’s fight against poverty, securing a future commitment from elected politicians; and
- serving as a public platform to disseminate and review government efforts in the fight against malnutrition.

One of CNI’s most recognized roles was its efficient advocacy work. In 2006, CNI launched a campaign subscribed to by ten presidential candidates who pledged to make the fight against malnutrition a national priority if elected. The pledge was to reduce chronic child malnutrition by 5 percent in children under five years old in the next five years (‘5 by 5 by 5’) and to close the urban-rural gap.

After the 2006 presidential election, CNI persuaded the winning candidate, Alan Garcia, to fulfil his electoral promises and contributed to drafting a policy document for action during the first 100 days of government. At decentralized levels, CNI promoted the engagement of Peru’s regional government leaders who signed the Lima Declaration on Child Nutrition, committing themselves to reducing chronic child malnutrition by 5 percent by 2011.

CNI’s evaluation of government progress in reducing malnutrition also provided important findings that were addressed through laws (e.g. decentralization in the implementation of the CRECER Strategy) and capacity-building programmes at the local levels.

In the last five years, CNI has had an important role in the successful horizontal articulation accompanying the formulation, adoption, implementation and monitoring of the national strategy, providing clear programmatic guidance and opportune technical assistance for effective implementation. CNI has promoted and facilitated horizontal integration across sectors, vertical integration across territories and financial or budgetary coordination across all levels. It has proven that coordination of efforts of non-governmental institutions, international organizations and donors can contribute significantly to political, institutional and regulatory FSN frameworks.

Source: Summarized from Mejia 2011
The experience in Peru shows the relevance of donors, international organizations and other development partners to work in harmony, agreeing on common financial, logistical and reporting procedures to support FSN policies and programmes. In this scheme, large, predictable, multi-annual donor commitments also contribute to ensure sustainability of FSN institutional frameworks.

Other factors that have helped to improve the effectiveness of FSN institutional frameworks are related to donors’ support for improving the coordination skills of policy-makers and bureaucrats and programme delivery. FSN institutional frameworks are constructed through coordination schemes, but civil servants and government staff are not accustomed to these schemes and require new skills to act as facilitators and coordinators. Introducing long-term capacity-building components to improve coordination among institutions and programme delivery has contributed to the construction of FSN frameworks (e.g. the NFPCSP in Bangladesh, the PSNP capacity-development component in Ethiopia).

Donors and development partners are gradually shifting towards sectoral aid, and are therefore moving their attention and resources from cross-sectoral issues to the coordination of actions within sectors. Sectoral aid through programmes will also mean that international organizations and donors will increasingly focus their support on executive arms of governments, overlooking the role of parliaments as accountability institutions. In this matter, supporting agencies should be careful not to concentrate efforts on external accountability that could undermine and take over the legitimate roles of legislative powers (De Renzio, 2006).

5. Lessons learned in establishing and strengthening FSN frameworks

Historical, political, economic and institutional contexts frame the ways in which the FSN concept is understood and how FSN frameworks are constructed and balanced. The historical underpinnings of FSN are fundamental in understanding political and institutional decisions on questions like administrative dependencies, roles of various line ministries and priorities in national policies and plans. Indeed, political and institutional landscapes are the result of power imbalances among different state structures, political constituencies and patronages, informal networks and norms and values of different entities and individuals. Therefore, it is important to understand the multiple contextual factors that underlie every decision on FSN institutions frameworks, and the difficulties associated with trying to replicate successful schemes from one country to another.

Analysing FSN institutional frameworks in different countries evidences that each country has its own specificities depending on factors such as political will, institutional contexts and architecture, role of civil society and donors, legislative support, budget allocation and accountability mechanisms. Brazil provides the most complete FSN institutional scheme which also has outstanding FSN outcomes, but other countries (e.g. Ethiopia) with sectoral schemes have also substantially improved the FSN situation. On the other side, countries like Mozambique show modest advances in FSN outcomes with moderate developments in their FSN institutional frameworks. In the case of Bangladesh, it has been difficult to find correlations between institutional frameworks and FSN outcomes because actions on the coordination of FSN are very recent.
In two of the case studies – Ethiopia and Brazil –, FSN outcomes have improved in the last decade, but as the result of very different FSN policy and programmatic approaches. Nevertheless, there are four points in common: (i) extraordinary political support for FSN framed in a broader development strategy and accompanied by resources; (ii) a series of flagship, resourced programmes that have seen successful outcomes; (iii) a continuous process of monitoring and accountability of results; and (iv) the involvement of civil society and donors. Peru’s experience reaffirms the importance of these four pillars in the construction of successful FSN institutional frameworks. Each of these pillars is further described below:

(i) Political long-term commitment to FSN

It is important to understand political will – which is frequently considered to be one of the preliminary conditions for successful FSN institutions – as positioning FSN at the centre of politics (i.e. genuine political will), instead of providing FSN as a tool for politicians. The governments in Brazil, Ethiopia and Peru show a strong and long-term commitment to FSN issues (either through sectoral or intersectoral support). In these countries, achieving food security is a state policy, so FSN frameworks should go beyond government terms in office. Linkages to long-term development planning and poverty reduction strategies, and the construction of policies, institutions and laws with sound participation of civil society, international organizations and donors, all firmly contribute to rooting FSN policies in a long-term vision. In the cases mentioned, FSN responses are framed in broader economic development schemes: Ethiopia has chosen a twin-track approach within a path of agriculture development-led industrialization, aiming to develop its economy through exports of high-value agricultural products; FSN policies and programmes in Brazil are strategically contributing to the integration of economic and social actions in a context of continuous and significant economic growth; and in Peru, FSN is framed in CRECER.

(ii) Flagship programmes and resources for FSN

Genuine political will is frequently accompanied by constant support within different political periods through flagship programmes and resources for FSN. Indeed, flagship programmes with a strong, wide and long-term investment and political leadership also help to explain the successful FSN outcomes in Brazil, Ethiopia and Peru that could not be found in other cases such as Bangladesh, Guatemala or Mozambique. The experiences analysed have shown that coordinated support for sectoral and accountable flagship programmes has definitively contributed to better FSN achievements, providing a gradual integration of other sectors and generating the roots and spaces for intersectoral approaches. Flagship programmes have also developed administrative mechanisms to deliver transfers in a timely fashion and at an appropriate quantity (e.g. PNSP in Ethiopia, Bolsa Familia in Brazil and JUNTOS in Peru are examples of where successful transfers had a significant impact on household food security).

(iii) Monitoring, transparency and data availability

Setting up monitoring and accountability mechanisms proved to be fundamental to support decision-making and provide orientation to FSN policies and programmes. Monitoring and accountability through sound knowledge provides the basis for dialogue to build political consensus and effective coordination. Sound knowledge comes, not only from scientific research, but also from exchange of information among governments, civil society and development partners. Accountability systems and monitoring have been key elements of success in FSN policy and institutional frameworks in Brazil, Ethiopia and Peru (i.e. the use of
results-based budgeting in Peru; the influential role of social control mechanisms in the budgeting process in Brazil; and the strong role of donors in Ethiopia).

(iv) Civil society involvement

FSN is a collective responsibility and all relevant actors must be involved. Civil society can identify issues, situations and demands on public policies that others cannot. The relationship between civil society and governments has been essential for decades in strengthening institutional frameworks, policies and programmes (e.g. CONSEA and FSN conferences in Brazil). In Peru, civil society has also played an outstanding role in advocacy and the construction of FSN policies. In Ethiopia, the role played by donors in building the capacity of institutions and ensuring accountability of results has been one of the key factors of success in the PRSP programme.

Some other findings and lessons captured by the study are:

- An important factor of success in FSN governance structures is decentralized administration – when financial flows and decision-making are channelled through local authorities and clear directives and accountability processes are on board. However, the performance of decentralized systems depends on the capacity of territorial and local agencies to deliver services. Ethiopia is a clear example of success in the effective implementation of programmes for FSN through decentralized institutions with capacities to deliver support when needed, and where coordination appears to be more fluent and effective.

- FSN institutional frameworks can be efficiently implemented through in-silo sectoral actions. While it is generally understood that FSN needs to be governed by intersectoral approaches, in the end, actions are sectorally-oriented and, in reality, most FSN practical work will be carried out and most FSN outcomes will be achieved through silos. Indeed, countries that follow multisectoral FSN policies and strategies, but employ silo structures for implementation through line ministries have also evidenced successful FSN outcomes. This is the case in Ethiopia, where the experience shows that it is important to not be too critical of using a silo approach to implement FSN. It is natural that different ministries want to have clear mandates and areas of intervention, but this can be difficult given the multifaceted nature of concepts like FSN. In this regard, it is also possible to conclude that differences in success in FSN outcomes (e.g. between Ethiopia on one side and Mozambique and Bangladesh on the other) need to be understood mainly in terms of level of political commitment, concentration of support on certain flagship programmes and accountability of results.

- Advancement in intersectorality is a gradual process that evolves through long-term actions that promote learning together through common implementation of policies, strategies and programmes. Successful intersectoral programming started with concrete practical experiences (e.g. programmes) where different line ministries learned to work together and were able to weigh and valorize the benefits that resulted from working together towards shared objectives. Examples of these processes are the linkages among complementary programmes (e.g. the Food Acquisition Programme and the National School Food Supply Programme) in Brazil or the synergies among different policies (e.g. emergency response and social safety nets) in Ethiopia. Other institutional mechanisms may contribute to intersectorality; for example, in Brazil, there was inclusion of FSN in the government agenda, conformation of spaces for integration between government sectors
and civil society, agreement on a common budget and monitoring and accountability of FSN outcomes among sectors.

- **Sometimes it is more feasible to support a multi-sectoral perspective such that programmes can be efficiently implemented through in-silo sectoral orientations.** Although intersectoral FSN institutional frameworks are desirable approaches, it is unlikely that most countries are prepared to fully benefit from these complex processes, which require relevant and consistent political support, time and investment. Most developing countries cannot afford this complexity and, in fact, their reality is framed by sectoral policies and powerful sectoral norms and values at the administrative level.

- **FSN institutional structures for coordinating policies and avoiding duplication of efforts are desirable when possible.** In this regard, one of the findings of the study is that coordination among line ministries occurred effectively when forums: maintained government support in spite of a change of administration; involved coalitions with non-government agencies; had clear mandates in supporting decision-making (vs. in direct implementation); channelled significant resources; involved coordination between political and technical/operational levels, specific staff and finances allocated to coordination; and were effectively led by one of the ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Social development in the case of Brazil) or by a coordinating scheme defined at a high level (e.g. the Presidency in the case of Peru).

- **Laws contribute towards improving FSN coordination frameworks and implementation of FSN policies.** They provide: (i) formal support for complex processes of articulation and negotiation among sectoral policies; (ii) better internalization of the FSN results framework in different line ministries; (iii) better decision-making powers and clearer mandates, ensuring spaces for effective intersectoral planning and monitoring; (iv) instruments for channelling the resources needed; (v) sustainability of institutional arrangements; and (vi) spaces needed for political action.

- **Political support for policies and institutions is key.** When this support is weak and when legitimacy in the construction of norms is poor (as in cases that move ahead without the participation of the civil society), FSN processes are unlikely to be maintained over time, and FSN legislation will not be enforced and will be essentially ineffective.

- **Successful FSN legislations are not the ones that have been started from scratch in the design of new FSN systems and institutions.** Rather, successful ones consolidate processes that were initially supported by low-range normative instruments which have improved and increased their resources over the years, accompanied by consensus and growing institutional capacities, as in the case of Brazil.

- **For international organizations and donors that aim to support FSN frameworks, it is important to understand FSN through both multisectoral and intersectoral lenses.** While intersectoral approaches are ideal, and policy, institutional and regulating frameworks are needed to effectively implement these approaches, norms and values of government and state administration officials remain sectoral. FSN achievements are measured through sectoral indicators and FSN policies are ultimately implemented through sectoral instruments and programmes. If capacities within recipient governments are reduced to managing complex institutional reforms, like the ones required for the construction of FSN frameworks, efforts might be more effective on programmatic actions at the sectoral level.
• Donors, international organizations and other development partners need to work in harmony, agreeing on common financial, logistical and reporting procedures to support national FSN policies and programmes. Experience with the Peruvian Child Nutrition Initiative (CNI) supports this. Based on experiences in Ethiopia and Peru, building coalitions of development partners can provide excellent grounds for long-standing support for the construction of FSN institutional frameworks.

6. Orientations for analysing institutional frameworks at country level

The methodology designed and implemented in this comparative study provides some important orientations on how to analyse FSN institutional frameworks at a country level. Based on this experience, this section is devoted to defining key steps that could be considered as a methodological basis for targeting future supports to FSN institutional frameworks.

(i) Understanding the contexts

When analysing the institutional frameworks for FSN at a country level, we need to understand the historical, economic, political and institutional contexts and underlying factors (e.g. norms and values, patronages) that may contribute to or restrict the construction of FSN institutional frameworks. Special attention should be paid to:

• FSN backgrounds (i.e. root causes of food insecurity);
• FSN conceptual framings (e.g. balance among FSN components, definition of FSN and references to food sovereignty and RtF);
• the political and economic context influencing FSN (e.g. political stability, structure and role of powers, role of international markets and macro-strategies prioritized). To describe the process, it is suggested to illustrate the relationship among dimensions through a chronogram which identifies different milestones (e.g. policies, institutions and laws);
• the administrative structure at central and decentralized levels (including resources for FSN, planning and budgeting processes);
• civil society and private sector influences in policy and decision-making processes; and
• the orientation and roles of donor support (e.g. main donors, main interests, main actions).

(ii) Gathering information on FSN outcomes and process

Information from national FSN situation assessments and recent FSN policy evaluations will provide current information on the FSN situation and the effectiveness of the process for achieving key FSN outcomes. At this stage, the perceptions of key informants will provide valuable information to correlate outcomes and frameworks.

(iii) Analysing the design of FSN institutional frameworks

The complexity and diversity of FSN frameworks suggests analysing the design through three dimensions:

• policies, strategies and instruments (i.e. programmes with FSN objectives);
• organizational architecture and coordination mechanisms (e.g. roles, dependencies, capacities of institutions involved in FSN, intersectoral coordination mechanisms);
• legislation supporting policies and institutional arrangements.

The study findings suggest that within these three main dimensions, a number of variables play a key role in ensuring the effectiveness of FSN institutional frameworks:

• political commitment to FSN linked to broader development schemes;
• existence of flagship programmes, as well as the level and term of the supporting investments;
• use of existing structures for the set-up and implementation of the frameworks;
• level of involvement of civil society in the construction and consolidation of institutional frameworks;
• level and extent of participation of decentralized administrations in the implementation and coordination of FSN frameworks;
• accountability, monitoring, evaluation and information systems guiding decisions on policies and programmes;
• FSN legislation designed to consolidate FSN processes, providing rules that can be enforced and introducing institutions that matter; and
• role and type of support from development partners for the construction of FSN institutional frameworks (e.g. national ownership, sustainability).

It is therefore important to understand the most valuable elements for each specific context, providing the means for developing or supporting national-specific FSN frameworks. Support to FSN institutional frameworks needs to be pragmatic involving sectorally-oriented actions to achieve the objectives defined in FSN policies and strategies. In this regard, nutrition, agriculture, fisheries, social protection, food-safety, and other FSN sectoral policies and programmes need to be supported as part of a comprehensive process to achieve FSN outcomes.

The development of FSN institutional frameworks implies changes in corporate culture and individual norms and values, capacity-building processes and social active participation. These ingredients need continuous support and sufficient time to be developed and consolidated by the different stakeholders.
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Annexes

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1. Background

Although the international community and many countries have been working for several decades to tackle food insecurity and malnutrition, a growing number of people are still hungry or live in highly vulnerable conditions. The recent global food crisis in 2007, followed by a global economic and financial crisis in 2008, exposed the inadequacy of efforts made thus far. Important structural food supply-demand imbalances and inadequacies in social protection systems persist, and global investment in rural development and smallholder agriculture has shrunk. The global crisis has thus highlighted the need to revisit the existing strategies and to improve coordination of responses at the national, as well as regional and global, levels.

A number of instruments have been put in place or developed since the World Food Summits in 1996, 2002 and 2009. These instruments have evolved over time, gradually resulting in a better understanding of the various causes of food insecurity and malnutrition. Since 2002, a twin-track approach has been adopted, seeking to increase the availability of food while at the same time improving access to food and nutrition and raising living standards, in particular by developing more effective social safety nets. There is also a growing conviction of the need to consider food security and nutrition together in responses and interventions, and to give more weight to recognition of the Right to Food.

Alarmed by the speed, extent and depth of the food crisis, national and international development stakeholders have reinstated support to food security actions as a global priority area for investment and action. This is reflected in the Comprehensive Framework for Action, which was developed by the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis in 2008 and updated in 2010, to take better account of global problems and issues, including recognition and promotion of the Right to Food and Nutrition, consideration of gender perspectives, climate change issues, etc.

At the same time, consideration was given at the international level to reforming the global food system and ensuring better coordination of the various initiatives and interventions. In 2009, the FAO conference adopted the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), expressing the will to improve governance of food security and nutrition (FSN) at global, regional and national levels. The CFS, which groups together all stakeholders and meets annually to evaluate results, aims, among other things, to ensure coherence and coordination for a global approach to FSN and constitutes a framework for sharing best practices, monitoring policies and analysing the impact of various initiatives undertaken to improve FSN.

At the national level, a number of initiatives have been taken by governments since the first World Food Summit, with or without technical and financial support from partners. Since 2001, FAO has provided technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of governments and country partners for developing, implementing and learning from national FSN strategies and programmes. The experience acquired in formulating, implementing and reviewing national FSN programmes and strategies has revealed a high level of influence of political and institutional aspects, which translates into strategic choices and commitments of countries. Even so, in spite of political commitments made at the highest political level and the adoption by governments of national FSN strategies and programmes, there are clear inadequacies in the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of FSN strategies and programmes at the country level. These inadequacies often come from deficiencies in the set-up and/or strengthening of
relevant institutional frameworks (including policy, organizational and legislative/regulatory frameworks) when drawing up FSN strategies and programmes.

In order to be more effective in guiding implementation of national FSN strategies and programmes and in ensuring better integration and uptake of FSN aspects in relevant institutional frameworks, it is important to analyse experiences from different existing institutional frameworks for FSN. The aim of the comparative case study described here is thus to identify guiding principles and lessons learned from various national experiences, in order to: (i) promote a reflection on ways of improving institutional frameworks for FSN at national, regional and local levels; (ii) improve mechanisms for ensuring coherence and coordination among all stakeholders and initiatives designed to achieve FSN; and (iii) strengthen the commitment to food security by politicians and various stakeholders.

For this, the comparative study will focus on four selected countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, chosen so as to present factors for a critical analysis on the issue of FSN governance, based on concrete cases in distinct geographical areas.

The study will be organized at two complementary levels: (1) at the national level in a group of selected countries based on prior identification of fields and sectors where actions are having a (positive or negative) impact on FSN, together with an analysis of the political, institutional and legislative framework; and (2) lessons to be learned in more general terms from these and other different frameworks developed at the national level.

2. Terms of reference

2.1 Definition of output(s) and/or outcome(s)

The Institute of Hunger Studies (IEH) will provide:

1. A final research proposal, including the preliminary results of the documentation review and the proposed methodology to implement the study (e.g. approach, fieldwork, analysis).

2. Four case studies on FSN institutional frameworks in four different countries. Each of the case studies will include:

   (i) a review of national policies and strategies: analysis of links and extent to which FSN objectives are taken into account by cross-cutting and/or sectoral national policies and strategies, in order to propose approaches and methods for increasing awareness of and action on FSN and the Right to Food

(ii) a review of organizational frameworks for FSN management and coordination: analysis of the relevance, strengths, weaknesses and efficiency of the existing mechanisms for steering and coordinating FSN, in order to strengthen the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in FSN at these levels and improve FSN governance;

(iii) a review of legislative and regulatory frameworks for FSN: analysis of the extent to which FSN and the Right to Food objectives are taken into account by different legislative and regulatory texts (e.g. relevance, strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks in addressing FSN issues).

(iv) A synthesis of lessons learned and key factors involved the implementation of institutional frameworks in each context.

The four case studies will be provided in the form of four country reports.
3. A report of the comparative study on institutional frameworks for FSN at country level, highlighting the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for a better integration and uptake of FSN issues in different political, organizational and legislative frameworks. The study will include guidelines and proposals for the setting up or strengthening of adequate institutional frameworks for food and nutrition security.

2.2 Description of services

IEH will work in close collaboration with the FAO staff involved in the preparation of the comparative study. FAO will provide guidance on the overall preparation of the study, including reviewing the research proposal, analysing the various status reports and approving country reports and the final report. FAO Representations in the countries involved will also provide support to the experts from the SP charged with completing case studies (e.g. facilitating the organization of conferences/meetings with resource staff and government officials, providing access to available documentation). FAO Representations will also provide feedback to the case studies, with enough time to enable it to be considered in the comparative study.

The services to be provided and activities to be performed will comprise the following:

1. Desk review of existing documentation on institutional frameworks (including policy, organizational and legislative/regulatory aspects) in different countries, as well as at regional and global levels. In addition to the four selected countries which will be analysed more in-depth in the case studies, the documentation review will try to identify other documented experiences of FSN institutional frameworks (e.g. existing reviews, case studies) in order to broaden the scope of the subsequent comparative analysis.

2. Field work in four selected countries. In selecting the countries, several criteria have been established, based on the importance of the support programme in the countries concerned and the importance accorded to FSN. These criteria include: (i) existence of a coordinating structure for FSN; (ii) high priority accorded to FSN by the country’s government and the existence of either significant FSN programmes and projects, or adoption of an FSN strategy and/or clear affirmation of elements of FSN strategies; (iii) experience in implementing FSN programmes. The country selection will have to be confirmed with the countries and other stakeholders involved in the study. Proposed countries are: Brazil/Bolivia (Latin America), Ethiopia/Mozambique (Africa), Bangladesh/Viet Nam (Asia).

3. The review of national policies and strategies at the country level will involve the following activities:

   • Carry out cross-referenced reading of cross-cutting and/or sectoral policies and strategies and analyse their links with FSN objectives and/or FSN national strategies/programmes.
   • Interview key government officers and other relevant stakeholders, and analyse the uptake of FSN by these policies and strategies at the national level and their expected impact.
   • Identify approaches and methods for improving FSN uptake in policies and national strategies.
• The review of organizational frameworks for FSN management and coordination at the country level will involve the following activities:
  • Analyse the different coordination mechanisms for FSN issues in the country, as well as the roles of the various FSN stakeholders in these mechanisms for guiding and conducting dialogue at different levels.
  • Analyse the mandates, functions and rights assigned to the specific structure in charge of coordinating FSN, including at devolved/decentralized levels.
  • Assess the relevance and effectiveness of the coordinating structure, as well as the capacities and resources available to carry out its mandate.
  • Undertake a SWOT analysis of the existing organizational frameworks for FSN management and coordination (specific coordinating structure and other eventual mechanisms for FSN), taking into account specific aspects of the national context.

4. The review of legislative and regulatory frameworks for FSN at the country level will involve the following activities:
  • Carry out a review of the legislative and regulatory provisions and frameworks in the major fields to FSN, and analyse the extent of uptake of FSN.
  • Analyse existing provisions and the extent to which they are implemented in fields or sectors that directly or indirectly work towards FSN, such as the right to food.
  • Develop proposals on how to improve the uptake of FSN legislative and regulatory frameworks and recommendations on how these can help to improve the implementation of policies, strategies and programmes for FSN.

5. Preparation of four country reports with the results of the analysis of the above-mentioned reviews. The analysis will consider the political context in which policies, institutions and regulatory frameworks are built, and how they might be influencing the success/failures of FSN frameworks.

6. Based on the four case studies and other experiences previously identified at national, regional and global levels, the SP experts, in collaboration with involved FAO staff, will undertake a comparative analysis of the different aspects involved in the set-up and implementation of institutional frameworks for FSN at the country level.

7. Prepare a report of the comparative study highlighting the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for a better integration and uptake of FSN issues in different political, organizational and legislative frameworks. This will be included, for example, analysing the key factors for successful implementation of FSN frameworks, and why well-constructed frameworks have been weakly implemented or not implemented at all with programmes that respond to these frameworks.
Annex 2. Study methodology

1. Introduction

FAO and other agencies are aiming to strengthen the capacity of governments and other country partners, through supporting the design – the formulation, implementation and review – of institutional food security and nutrition (FSN) frameworks.

This study aims to analyse experiences from existing institutional frameworks for FSN from different countries in order to identify guiding principles and lessons learned from those national experiences. The goals are to: (i) promote a reflection on ways of improving institutional frameworks for FSN; (ii) improve the mechanism for ensuring coherence and coordination among all stakeholders and initiatives designed to achieve FSN; and (iii) strengthen the commitment to food security by decision-makers and various stakeholders. In order to do so, and as indicated in the Terms of Reference, the Institute of Hunger Studies (IHE) will carry out a cross-country comparative study on institutional frameworks.

This document lays out the methodology to conduct the study, including the development of a theoretical framework to allow for comparability and details on how the literature review, country case studies and comparative analysis will be conducted.

2. Theoretical framework

Institutional framework analysis requires analysing systems that are multitier (i.e. global, regional, national and local), multistakeholder (i.e. several state and non-state actors) and multidimensional (i.e. legal framework, policy framework and policy instruments).

The theoretical fundaments of analysis will be based on contrasting the design of institutional frameworks and expected FSN outcomes with the existing institutional arrangements and the achieved FSN outcomes. Expected outcomes will differ depending on the country and sectorial strategies; they can include improvements in nutrition indicators, decreases in number of eligible households for social safety nets schemes (including incomes and assets), increases in food availability (e.g. increases in average household production, increases in months of consumption from own production) and so on.

Figure 1 shows the trends/scenarios that may occur: (i) Expected FSN outcomes are not achieved because the designed FSN framework was not implemented, or there was a flaw in the framework designed; or (ii) Desired FSN outcomes are achieved, either because the FSN framework was appropriate and well-implemented, or, on the other hand, a successful alternative institutional framework emerged independently.

Consequently, in order to determine the success or failure of the implementation of FSN institutional frameworks, some key variables have been identified. This study will look into the importance of these variables through a comparative study of four countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia and Mozambique.
The key variables identified for comparison between country case studies are:

a. **FSN framework design**
   - Conceptual framings of FSN. Alternative, complementary or competing conceptualization of FSN by main actors (e.g. social protection, food security and food sovereignty, poverty reduction, sustainable development)
   - National policies, strategies and laws (and how they relate among them), including the proposed organizational set-ups (e.g. purpose-created FSN organizations, coordination platforms and committees)
   - Policy instruments for implementation (e.g. cash for work, school meals)
   - Expected outcomes (what the expectations were on impact on FSN indicators).

The study of this framework – legislative policy instruments and outcomes – should be carried out using the most updated information available.

b. **FSN outcomes**

Assessing the convergence or divergence of expected outcomes with the measured outcomes in each country. To assess this, this study will analyse:

- existing FSN assessments in the country;
- existing FSN policy evaluations in the country;
- key informants’ perceptions on FSN outcomes and if they meet the expectations created by the institutional frameworks.
c. Institutional architecture and arrangements

- Roles and functions of institutions involved in FSN
- Intersectoral coordination mechanisms. Existence and impact of intersectoral platforms and interministerial committees related to FSN, and existence of multistakeholder platforms (e.g. government, NGOs, universities, private sector)
- Inter-tier national-local coordination mechanisms

As a result of this analysis, we would be able to building different organization charts that will enable us to visualize the relationships among different actors in each country, and thus will permit a visual comparison of the institutional architecture among countries.

d. Implementation processes

- FSN actors’ perspectives on real implementation and impact of the institutional framework
- FSN actors’ perspectives on the coherence and relevance of these policies
- Relation policies- instruments-outcomes. Assessment of the choice of policy instruments vis-à-vis policy frameworkand assessment of FSN outcomes Decision-making processes in FSN
  - Criteria for allocation of resources from the Ministry of Planning/Finance to relevant ministries (e.g. health, agriculture, education, social affairs)
  - Criteria for intraministerial allocation of resources and staff to certain policy instruments over others – degree of prioritization of FSN objectives
  - Intrasectoral mainstreaming of FSN objectives and indicators (degree of use of FSN indicators and outcomes to guide allocation of resources within ministries)
  - Incentives and accountability. Existence (or not) of accountability mechanisms to ensure compliance to FSN framework. Importance of political and economic incentives in the roll-out of the FSN framework (or divergence from it) at all levels.
  - Donor agencies’ role in decision-making in the allocation of resources at national and ministerial levels

- National and local capacities for implementation.

Assessment of capacities – in resources, staff and knowledge – for local public institutions to implement FSN framework objectives. The analysis might include cases of prioritization of certain FSN objectives over others due to diminished capacity: what policies are followed and for what reasons.

3. The study

In order to assess the elements that compose a successful or unsuccessful FSN institutional framework, and bring insights into how to improve FSN uptake in policies and national strategies and an effective implementation of FSN policies and programmes, this study will consist of a general literature review and a comparative analysis including four country case

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20 By incentives we mean different reasons why decisions carried out by an organization or someone within an organization might diverge from its stated objectives. For example, a donor’s emphasis on maternal and neo-natal nutrition might divert resources away from other objectives such as school feeding.
studies. These will be conducted using the theoretical framework detailed above and will aim to answer the following questions:

- **How is the institutional architecture** for FSN (including public policies, organizational and legislative/regulatory frameworks) and the **mechanisms for articulation and coherence**? Are they relevant and efficient? What are the gaps, inconsistencies and overlaps?
- **To what extent do the implementation processes** contribute to achieve the expected outcomes on FSN (e.g. decision-making process, designing of policy instruments, allocation of resources)?
- **To what extent are FSN objectives mainstreamed** into national legislation, policies, plans and strategies, including decentralized operational plans and poverty eradication strategies? How can this FSN uptake be improved?
- **How is the participation of civil society and the private sector** in policy planning and implementation? Are the needs of **vulnerable groups** addressed? Is the policy gender-sensitive?
- **What lessons** can be extracted from the implementation of FSN policies?

1. **General desk review.** 10 days.

A general literature review on the assessment of FSN institutional frameworks will be carried out. This review will include:

   i. Review of donor and agency (including FAO) strategic interest in institutional approaches to FSN: Brief history of FAO’s and other agencies’ efforts in technical support for FSN institutionalization.

   ii. Revision of FSN governance frameworks: this will include global agreements on FSN governance led by UN and FAO such as the revitalization of the Committee for Food Security (CFS), as well as a review of regional commitments on FSN coordination (e.g. NEPAD’s CAADP), FAO conferences.

   iii. Review of developing country methods and approaches to FSN: regulations, coordination mechanisms/organizations and policy frameworks and instruments, and how these interrelate. This will also include a review of previous assessments of FSN institutional frameworks in developing countries, including FSN policy evaluations.

2. **Country-case studies.** 30 days per country

Building on the general literature review, and in order to gather the data for the comparative analysis, four country case studies will be conducted. Fieldwork will be conducted in Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia and Mozambique. These four case studies have been chosen by FAO as countries that have had important public support for FSN and have shown leadership in implementing coordinating structures for FSN.

Each country study will consist of a country desk review, the setting of an interview agenda, key informant interviews and the elaboration of a synthesis report.

   a. **Country desk review.** 3 days before the field mission in which IEH researcher assigned to each country will carry out a desk review of main relevant documentation analyse the national contexts, strategies, institutional architecture and FSN outcomes, legislative and regulatory frameworks. As indicated in the TOR, the FAO country office will support with the provision of relevant information. Following the ‘Key Variables’ above, this review should cover:
– *FSN framework design*

- Conceptual framings of FSN. Use of alternative conceptual frameworks
- Existing national policies, strategies and legal and regulatory frameworks (and how they related among them), including the proposed organizational set-ups (e.g. purpose-created FSN organizations, coordination platforms and councils)
- Policy instruments for implementation
- Expected outcomes – What the expectations were on impact on FSN indicators.

**Note:** IEH researchers must be aware of the countries’ political and economic context and understand how this may shape policy-making processes.

– *FSN outcomes*
  - Existing food security assessments in the country
  - Existing FSN policy evaluations in the country

– *Institutional architecture*

– *First approaches for implementation*

– *Relation policies-instruments-outcomes. Choice of policy instruments vis-à-vis policy framework*

– *Assessment of FSN outcomes*

This literature review will give an overall idea of the FSN framework design and formulation. The interviews below will aid to ascertain the degree of implementation and the effectiveness of these FSN regulations, organizational set-up and policies.

**b. Setting-up interview agenda**

The FAO country office will help the researcher to prepare a list of key informants. The FAO country office will arrange an interview agenda and set up meetings with the relevant interviewers. The researcher must make the FAO country office aware of the dates he/she will be in the country to conduct his/her fieldwork.

Suggested organizations to interview – completed by country FAO office.

- FAO
- IFAD
- WFP
- UNDP
- UNICEF
- World Bank
- IFPRI
- NGO umbrella organization, food security network coordinating NGO
- Farmers’ organizations
- Organization representing vulnerable groups (especially women and children)
- Private sector representative – board of commerce
- Main FSN donors depending on the country (e.g. Spanish cooperation in Bolivia, USAID in Ethiopia)
- Research institutions
- Food security coordination platform
- Inter-ministerial platforms on FSN-related issues
- Ministry of Finance/Planning

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c. **Key informant interviews**

IEH researchers will conduct a series of interviews with key informants (e.g. UN agencies, government officers — *see below*). Interviews will be semi-structured so as to cater questions for each informant, maintain flow in the exchange with respondents and to leave spaces for the exploration of emergent issues.

Interview questionnaires should be designed by each country consultant to adapt them to the specific interviews conducted – depending on the institution, the recent history of the institution and of the particular respondent, yet orientative questions are suggested below. IEH researchers must liaise with FAO country offices to ensure they understand the political and interpersonal context in which those interviews occur.

**Orientative questions to key informants:**

*Questions to all respondents* (Note that questions follow the variables in the theoretical framework – the emphasis on certain questions will depend on the respondent, e.g. when speaking to ministries, a greater emphasis can be assigned to issues of decision-making, coordination and capacity)

- What are the roles and responsibilities of your institution regarding FSN?
- Briefly describe the FSN situation and FSN outcomes.
- What are the key institutional mechanisms in place to ensure positive FSN outcomes?
  - What do you think are the most important regulations and policies in place? Could you give a small recent history of how FSN has been addressed in your country? And in your organization’s work?
- Is the framework of food security used here or are other concepts in use, such as social protection, poverty reduction, etc.? If so, how do you think this conceptualization influences FSN outcomes?
- Do you think the planned outcomes have been achieved? Have the objectives of these laws and policies been met? Has this framework brought about an improvement in FSN indicators?
- What do you think is the relevance and coherence of these frameworks? In what degree have they been implemented? Do you think they are well-designed? Is there a coherence between the regulation, the policy and the instrument chosen (*the researcher must give examples*)
- What works? What doesn’t work? What are your suggestions for an improved FSN framework? What policies and instruments do you think are necessary to ensure FSN outcomes?
- How are national resources (e.g. from Treasury to FSN-relevant ministries) allocated? How are these decisions made (i.e. to allocate to what ministries and to what programmes/instruments and in what quantity?) Who decides and with what criteria?
- Do you think the right incentives and mechanisms for accountability exist for an adequate implementation of FSN policy?
- Are there any specific coordinating structures for FSN in the country? What is your role in it? What is your assessment of their impact? What do you think are the main challenges for coordination in FSN? What do you propose to ensure coordination?
- Could you give an example of actions/projects designed jointly by your institution and others aimed to achieve FSN?
- Do you think specific ministries and specific sectors (e.g. health, education) integrate FSN objectives and indicators into their actions? How? If not, why?
- What real capacity – in resources, staff, human capital – do ministries have to implement guidelines on the ground?

**Questions to UN agencies and IFIs: FAO, UNDP, WFP and World Bank**

On top of the questions above, the researcher should:

- inquire about agencies’ history in FSN institutional/public policy support in the country;
- ask about perceptions on the implementation of that framework by relevant actors and potential reasons for compliance/non-compliance of guidelines set by coordination mechanisms;
- gather proposals on how to improve the uptake of FSN in legislative and regulatory frameworks; and
- obtain views around better ways to engage in technical cooperation with public actors and to promote the implementation of policies, strategies and programmes for FSN.

**Questions to NGO umbrella organizations, food security networks and FSN main donor agencies**

Added questions could be:

- Degree of civil society participation in design and implementation of policies
- What is the role of donors in the design and implementation of FSN frameworks, and in the coordination efforts?

**Questions to members of FSN coordination committees and other FSN-related interministerial platforms**

Here the researcher will be able to enquire more in detail about the coordination efforts:

- Who participates in these committees? Who leads them? How many resources are channelled through these councils? What is the role of donors?
- Do participating actors (e.g. the participating ministries) follow the recommendations/guidelines put forward by these coordination mechanisms? If not, why?

**Additional questions to ministries**

- How relevant are the FSN policies for your everyday work? Are the coordination mechanisms useful?
- Is your ministry able to respond to the demands of those policies? If not, why?
- What resources (financial, human) have been allocated and earmarked for FSN objectives?
- What changes – in the policies, in the organizational set-up and coordination – would you propose to ensure your ministry can contribute to FSN objectives?

d. Country case study analysis

Using the results of the general desk review, the results of the country literature review and the interviews, the researcher will carry out a qualitative analysis that will deliver a synthesis of lessons learned and key factors involved in the implementation of institutional frameworks. The researcher will analyse the interview notes and literature reviews, manually coding the data in a first instance, and then re-arranging those coda within broader more abstract categories. The goal of this process will be to systematically notice relevant phenomena, collecting examples of those phenomena, and finally analysing those phenomena in order to find commonalities, differences, patterns and structures.

Ultimately, to allow for cross-country comparability, this analysis will need to be incorporated into the variables of the theoretical framework detailed above.

The output will be a country case study report that also includes a SWOT analysis of the existing frameworks for FSN management and coordination. The structure to be followed in the report is that of the variables of the theoretical framework, so as to ensure cross-country comparability. These country study reports will be shared with the FAO country offices for feedback.

3. Comparative analysis

Using the country case study reports and the general literature review, the Institute of Hunger Studies will conduct a comparative analysis. Comparing a few countries – what is called ‘focused comparison’ in comparative political studies – allows for control through the careful selection of countries, plus it permits encompassing nuances specific to each country. This study’s countries have been selected to carry out a ‘Most Similar Systems Design’ (MSSD) that seeks to compare systems that share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others. For this study, FAO and IEH chose countries with a similar public commitment to FSN and which adopted FSN policies and coordinating mechanisms. This comparative analysis will allow us to flesh out the explanatory factors that lead to different outcomes in each country.

IEH will thus contrast the variables obtained from each case study country – manually coding and categorizing to bring out the relevant similarities and differences – as well as the SWOT analysis, obtaining:

- key factors involved in the implementation of institutional frameworks;
- weaknesses and strengths of these frameworks in addressing FSN concerns;
- lessons learned for a better integration and uptake of FSN issues in different political, organization and legislative frameworks; and
- guidelines for the setting-up or strengthening of adequate institutional frameworks for FSN.

All these results will be put together into a comparative study report.

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Annex 3. Summary of country studies

BANGLADESH

Since Independence in 1971, Bangladesh has made remarkable achievements in increasing food grain production. In three decades, the country tripled rice production, meeting its goal of self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, this increase in food grain production did not keep pace with hunger reduction. Despite important achievements in reducing malnutrition among women and children, the country still has one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world, with 41 percent of children estimated to be underweight as of 2007. With over 40 percent of its population suffering from hunger, Bangladesh is unlikely to meet the first Millennium Development Goal target on hunger.

The impact of the 2008 global food price spike demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of Bangladeshis to shocks, but also their capacity to deal with crisis. Rice, counting for three-quarters of the calories consumed by the low-income households, almost doubled its price from 2007 to 2008. The Government reacted by strengthening food reserves and safety nets, including a new 100-day employment scheme. It boosted rice production by public and private channels to be sold below market prices, banned rice exports, doubled emergency food stocks and subsidized seeds, fertilizers and fuel for irrigation systems.

Despite this capacity to manage crises, however, food security faces important challenges associated to the extreme vulnerability of the country to climate change, its strong demographic pressure, the scarcity of land and water resources and a significant exposure to food market shocks. To overcome these challenges, the Government of Bangladesh has embarked since the 1996 World Food Summit in a policy reform process, and it is mobilizing investments to implement a country-led plan of action on food security and nutrition.

The National Food Policy (approved in 2006) represents an important shift towards a comprehensive approach to food security. Before that, the focus was only on food availability and the main policy goal was attaining rice self-sufficiency. But that proved to be insufficient to reduce hunger and malnutrition. Accordingly, the Government of Bangladesh incorporated into the national food policy the other three dimensions: food access (physical and economic) and food utilization, emphasizing the linkages among availability, access and nutrition outcomes.

In order to count on a programmatic framework to translate this policy into action, the National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008-2015) was developed. This plan adopted a twin-track approach, combining short-term instruments to improve food access by vulnerable households (such as cash and food transfers) with long-term interventions aimed to improve productivity and income generation. This approach is embedded in strategies that strengthen linkages to nutrition interventions.

More recently, the Country Investment Plan (2011-2015) was formulated and reviewed through a wide consultative process. It is the financing arm of the food policy, and provides a coherent set of 12 priority investment programmes aimed to plan and invest in a coordinated way. This plan contributes to increase the convergence and alignment of domestic and external sources of funding, and to mobilize additional resources from development partners, the private sector and other stakeholders.
Involving all the relevant actors across different sectors and levels in food security policy-making, investment planning, implementation and monitoring has proven to be challenging. The support offered by the National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme, jointly implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, has been critical in developing the institutional architecture and capacities to plan, implement and monitor food security policies and programmes.

For a truly cross-sectoral approach to food security, the institutional set-up must ensure coordination among government agencies and ministries at political, technical and operational levels. To facilitate this coordination, the Government of Bangladesh put in place an institutional architecture involving 16 ministries and divisions, the civil society and development partners. A Cabinet body, the Food Planning and Monitoring Committee, ensures intersectoral coordination at the highest policy level. The Food Policy Working Group and its four Thematic Teams facilitate coordination at technical and operational levels. The Food Planning and Monitoring Unit acts as the Secretariat providing support to the whole architecture. This institutional set-up is a unified framework for monitoring the National Food Policy Plan of Action, the Country Investment Plan and the progress towards MDG on hunger.

The structure is there; now it has to demonstrate that it works. For that, it must overcome some challenges and sustain the commitment of every stakeholder over the whole process, particularly at implementing and monitoring. The institutional architecture is relatively recent, and it will take some time to be internalized by all the relevant bodies and levels within the public sector, the civil society and development partners.

High political engagement is necessary, but not sufficient to ensure adequate coordination if the operational and technical levels do not allocate enough time and human resources for this purpose. New capacities must be developed on planning, budgeting and monitoring at the different ministries, to become familiar with results-based management. While support and resources are being provided by development partners to strengthen capacities to formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate food and nutrition security investments, the permanence of the staff must also be secured; otherwise valuable trained resources are lost when transferred.

The institutional framework for policy-making, implementation and monitoring is mainly composed by government institutions. Some spaces have been established for promoting the dialogue and alignment with development partners. But civil society engagement has not been sufficiently institutionalized, despite the relevance of NGOs and think tanks in providing services and generating knowledge, and the potential of the private sector to help bridge the financing gap.

Another major challenge is to balance the weight of the three dimensions of food security. The current policy is a step forward in the right direction, but some stakeholders consider that food access and nutrition issues are not given the same relevance as food availability. Competition for leadership should also be avoided. For instance, coordination between the two pillars of nutrition must be strengthened, namely by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (e.g. supplementation, fortification and disease-control activities) and the Ministry of Agriculture (e.g. food-based actions).

Learning from past experiences with national councils that became non-operational, Bangladesh preferred to build on the already existing structures and designated the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management to lead the process. This ministry was mandated to lead the governance of food security among line ministries and partners, in addition to its own
responsibility with food planning, distribution and management of stocks. As a consequence, a bigger effort is required to develop full ownership by other sectoral ministries, in order to secure a truly cross-sectoral governance of food security. Despite the fact that the Cabinet-level unit secures coordination at the high political level, participation in operational and technical levels is not yet well-balanced among ministries.

BRAZIL

The Brazilian experience has its own particular characteristics. It has been possible to observe an overall consensus, on two separate fronts, on the advancements made over recent years in relation to the FSN policy within Brazil. The first front is the priority given by President Inacio Silva Lula’s Government towards combating hunger and poverty (expressed as an investment into public policies for promoting human rights to receive food), and the second is the construction of an institutional identity which is closely linked to the proposal-making capabilities of The National Council of Food Security and Nutrition (CONSEA).

The biggest challenges faced by Brazil have been articulating and coordinating the various programmes that are already under way, by means of a number of participatory practices, federal agreements and a comprehensive and intersectoral conception, making it possible to fully incorporate the multiple arrays of FSN dimensions. This has enabled the food security policy to cease being an exclusive government policy and, instead, become a State policy, which must then be further structured into a policy and National Plan for subsequent organization through an intersectoral system.

The existing institutional identity can be roughly translated into an integrated approach to public policies under an intersectorality framework, which has led to the proposal for a supra-sectoral FSN national system capable of coordinating government sectors and civil society as a whole in order to create integrated programmes and activities. This perspective assumes the existence of social participation governmental bodies, as well as public areas with matching intersectoral representation, including participation by governmental sectors and civil society organizations based on coordination dynamics and agreement-making devices, reproduced at both State and municipal levels. This is in addition to the development of a legal framework for ensuring the sustainability and permanent status of this particular approach.

CONSEA is considered to have played a key role in its mobilization of society by providing advisory services to the Presidency of the Republic, supporting the state and municipal councils, holding national conferences and getting to grips with current legal frameworks. The national conferences, for example, have been essential for: gaining agreement on the FSN concept adopted on a national basis, established as part of the Organic Law on Food Security and Nutrition (LOSAN – Law no. 11.346 of 2006) for the consolidation and dissemination of FSN topics as the main aim of public policies and, most importantly, in relation to this particular project; for disclosing FSN National Plan guidelines and priorities; and for helping to expand on FSN public policies based on historical population demands, in general, and social movements, in particular.

The high point of this construction process occurred in September 2006 when LOSAN was sanctioned by the President of the Republic of Brazil. LOSAN’s approval definitively positioned FSN as a relevant guideline, aiding the implementation of mechanisms for promoting intersectorality and social participation through the creation of the National System for Food Security and Nutrition (SISAN) – one of the biggest challenges in Brazil at the present time.
The FSN National Plan has also recently been approved; the participative formulation of this plan was created in tandem with the standardization of the National System for Food Security and Nutrition (SISAN). The Plan provides an institutional framework, necessary for the consolidation of programmes and activities related to the guidelines agreed upon at the 3rd CNSAN – FSN National Conference, explaining, for example, the responsibilities of various Brazilian Union institutions and entities in relation to its implementation. The Plan was presented at the beginning of November 2011 at the 4th FSN National Conference, garnering a considerable amount of commitment on the part of Brazilian Federation State Governments.

The FSN National Plan has been organized from a logical perspective, seeking to overcome great challenges for promoting FSN through a number of initiatives which address priority goals for achieving strategic objectives. The results of these need to be monitored and evaluated in order to allow progressive realization of the Human Right to Adequate Food (HRAF). Considering the need for constant improvement, this Plan (and any subsequent versions) will be revised every two years based on guidelines supplied by the Interministerial Chamber of Food Security and Nutrition (CAISAN).

There is a great amount of expectation in Brazil at the current time on how the policies contained in the current FSN National Plan, comprising SISAN, will be coordinated and implemented, particularly in terms of the involvement of local entities (municipal and state) in the decision-making processes, as well as the use of existing resources. It is considered to be too early to carry out an implementation process assessment.

It is generally concluded that policies implemented in Brazil have arisen out of a long historical social mobilization and capacities construction process, having encountered favourable conditions in terms of policy design, implementation and consolidation, during a period of economic growth over last ten years.

These factors have combined to create a virtuous retro-alimentation cycle that has created, tested and progressed in terms of consolidating an innovative institutional system within the FSN sphere, decisively contributing to greater implemented policy effectiveness. The biggest challenge currently faced by this system is multi-territorial consolidation, as well as the ability to achieve higher levels of coherence and coordination.

ETHIOPIA

The main framing used in Ethiopia is food security, yet in practice, it is understood as availability of and access to food: food security programme objectives, targeting and monitoring is based on a perception of food insecurity as a lack of food that can be addressed through ensuring households acquire a basic basket of agricultural goods.

There is not a food security or nutrition law per se in Ethiopia. Most instruments tackling food and nutrition insecurity are articulated through strategies and programmes. To increase availability and access to food and to improve health outcomes, the Government launched the Food Security Programme (2003-2009, continued now 2010-2014). These programmes aimed to solve the problems of the chronically food insecure households who had been predictable recipients every year of emergency food aid. The most important objective of this programme is graduation, where recipients of aid manage to maintain and build enough assets so that they do not need assistance in the future. In sum, since 2003 there has been a move away from emergency food aid to developmental safety net programmes (including predictable cash and
food transfers) that aim to maintain livelihoods, asset building programmes to promote graduation and voluntary resettlement programmes to more productive lands.

Food security policy has been drawn in parallel to an agricultural growth policy. The aim is to generate a two-speed rural development process where funding is put into productivity, quality enhancement and commercialization initiatives in high agricultural productivity potential areas, simultaneously protecting and promoting livelihoods in food insecure regions.

This report details the policy framework of FSN in Ethiopia, including the food security programme and its components, the disaster risk management programme and the education and nutrition policy.

It also details the expected outcomes of this policy framework. When the ‘real’ outcomes of the framework are revealed, there is evidence of some progress. There are improvements in GDP growth, poverty reduction, crop production and productivity, use of improved agricultural technologies, increase in per capita food consumption and reduction of malnutrition indicators. Impact evaluations show that the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), as a substantial and predictable transfer, was an adequate mechanism: those households that had received timely transfers experienced improved food security. The impact assessment also backed the need for building synergies with “packages of agricultural support”. It is in response to this that the Household Asset Building Programme was designed to build on the existing PSNP structure to enhance likelihood of graduation from food security.

The report draws out the FSN institutional architecture and shows there is a significant silo structure for the implementation of FSN at a federal level. Food security tasks are clearly contained within the Ministry of Agriculture and nutrition tasks are under the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Agriculture is the one responsible for food security in Ethiopia (understood as food availability and food access), through the promotion of increased agricultural productivity through its extension services, the delivery of cash and food transfers through safety nets to ensure food access and the transfer of microcredits in cash or in-kind to safeguard and build assets.

Despite other relevant ministries having signed the National Nutrition Strategy and Policy, the Ministry of Health is, in practice, considered the sole responsible body for the implementation of nutrition. As happened with food security, nutrition is a multidimensional concept that covers many ministerial competencies, yet in Ethiopia it has been contained within the Ministry of Health.

There are different degrees of success with intersectoral coordination mechanisms, depending on the department or ministry. FSN coordination in the case of emergencies – particularly considering the integration of nutrition concerns – is reported as being very good.

PSNP coordination mechanisms worked well, and they indicate that this is because there are significant amounts of funds involved. Therefore, decision-making represents a change in the direction of resources, and a significant amount of funds are destined by donors for the coordination effort itself. The nutrition coordination mechanisms have not worked as effectively.

The determinants for an effective interministerial coordination are: channelling of substantial resources; financial and human resources assigned to coordination; and decision-making powers and leadership in fundamental issues such as nutrition (balanced with the need for practical/achievable implementation mechanisms). All stakeholders spoke of the important
coordination that occurs at the woreda level between different offices/departments. The physical proximity-sharing offices and meetings at the woreda council or in the field in kebeles allow officers and extensionists to be aware of what others do.

All stakeholders confirm the PSNP and HABP programmes are being implemented, and see the effects on the ground. The PSNP has managed to deliver a social safety net in the drought-prone rural areas in Ethiopia. All stakeholders, even those involved in the programmes, indicate that progress has been slow but that the mechanisms are being consolidated. Respondents see great value – in sustainability and feasibility – of having used existing government mechanisms to deliver the PSNP and HABP programmes, instead of creating a parallel project structure.

UNICEF respondents indicated that the government is making efforts in nutrition, particularly recently to push for the implementation of activities. Yet, the Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI), sees room for improvement in the implementation of the nutrition policies.

There is general consensus among interviewees on the coherence and relevance of the FSN-related policies. Interviewees agree that the policies address the problems of food insecurity in Ethiopia, and that, if these were appropriately implemented, there would be satisfactory impact on food-insecure households.

With regard to food security programmes, there is a clear preference for support to rural areas than to urban areas. Donor preferences are also a fundamental factor. At a broader level, support by the World Bank and other donors is geared towards creating in Ethiopia a model of an export-oriented agricultural economy growing through industrialization led by agricultural development.

There is a lack of coordination among different ministries as well as inadequate mainstreaming of food security indicators in the individual ministries. Since the beginning of the food security programme, woredas were targeted based on the likelihood of drought and a past history of food aid. These could be considered proxies of vulnerability, but are not food security indicators per se. Nutrition indicators are not used for targeting. Similarly, nutrition programmes do not take into consideration in their programming (at least at a practical level) other elements of food security that are fundamental for positive nutritional outcomes (e.g. food production and access, such as engaging in increasing the availability of and access to nutritious food crops).

Middle-range institutions – from regional ones to woredas – face a range of incentives that help to shape the decisions they make. These incentives come from the federal level, regional officials and donors. They also come horizontally from NGOs and community-based organizations working in local communities, and from the citizens who comprise the woreda, kebele and village.

Government capacity is not static, as the food security programmes have a strong capacity-building component, so different infrastructure, skills and abilities are constantly being developed. According to these interviewees, the capacities required by the implementation of the PSNP can be carried out with the staff’s existing level of capacity.

The report also details the lessons learned for effective implementation of FSN frameworks:
- political commitment;
- donor involvement;
- use of existing structures in parallel to capacity-building;
- interministerial coordination of FSN programmes or intrasectorial mainstreaming of FSN indicators;
- resources, decision-making and leadership for effective coordination;
- restructuring for coherent and effective performance;
- creating synergies between policies;
- transparency;
- pragmatism and reflexivity;
- social safety nets that are not temporary;
- adequate guidance for programme implementers;
- food security programmes that go hand in hand with broader economic development schemes; and
- appropriate incentives for implementation.

The report closes with a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis of the FSN institutional framework in Ethiopia.

**MOZAMBIQUE**

Since the end of the war in 1992, Mozambique has been considered an example of success in terms of post-conflict reconstruction, and it has also made noteworthy progress in the democratization process. With about 23 million inhabitants, the country's economic growth rate has steadily increased over the past decade (at about 8 percent per year). In political and social terms, Mozambique has remained stable, except for occasional episodes of conflict such as the riots in September 2010 due to rising prices of food and other essentials.

Nevertheless, Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, occupying the 184th position in the ranking of the Human Development Index (HDI), out of a total of 187 countries. Progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been very modest. The poverty situation is quite serious: more than half of the population (54.7 percent) lives below the poverty line, of which about 57 percent live in rural areas. Mozambique is also one of the countries most affected by HIV/AIDS, the prevalence of which has increased in the last decade.

Thirty-eight percent of the population is undernourished, and 47 percent of all children face chronic food insecurity. Mozambique is often affected by natural disasters (e.g. droughts and floods), and is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change. In the last three years, the country has suffered a wave of large-scale purchases of vast tracts of land (i.e. land grabbing), particularly for biofuel crops.

The FSN approach used in Mozambique is comprehensive as it contemplates multiple dimensions (e.g. availability, access, use and utilisation, stability) and the RtF perspective. FSN is present in the main strategic policy instruments at the macro level, namely the Five-Year Government Programme 2010-2014 (PQG) and the Plan of Action for Poverty Reduction 2011-2014 (PARP). The FSN perspective is also included in other strategic sectoral instruments (e.g. health, education, trade, agriculture, fisheries, environment and social security, among others).
Mozambique also has a National Food and Nutrition Security Strategy, which was adopted in 1998 and reviewed in 2007 (ESAN II). The main change in the 2007 policy review concerned the integration of the approach of the human right to adequate food. Mozambique has indeed shown important progress in terms of recognizing the right to food in its policies and strategies. At the moment, a proposal for a law on the right to food is actually being formulated. Nevertheless, Mozambique has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to date.

The institutional structure responsible for the coordination of FSN actions in Mozambique is the Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security (SETSAN). SETSAN was created in 1998 to coordinate the implementation of ESAN I and to monitor food insecurity and vulnerability in the country. However, SETSAN was only legally established in 2010, after the adoption of Decree No. 24/2010, published in the national journal of laws (Diário da República). The creation of a National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSAN), directly under the Prime Minister’s Office, was proposed during the formulation of ENSAN II in 2007; however, it was not accepted.

In institutional terms, SETSAN is still connected to the agricultural sector, although it has gained the status of a public institute and is now directly controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. Discussions are ongoing about a proposal of an organic statute for SETSAN, which will lead to a new institutional arrangement, legal recognition, administrative autonomy and its own staff.

At present, SETSAN is composed of the Executive Secretariat, the Technical Council, the Advisory Council and two Permanent Units, the latter of which have several working groups. Through its bodies, SETSAN includes the participation of several actors (e.g. government sectors, civil society, development partners, academia). SETSAN is also present at the province level through provincial secretariats. Nevertheless, in the provinces there is only one focal point under the Provincial Agricultural Directorate, which is manifestly insufficient.

Mozambique has also shown significant progress in terms of the formulation of FSN strategic instruments. The design process of ESAN II, including the participation of multiple sectors and integrating the right to food perspective, is an example of that. In institutional terms, the country has also made greater efforts towards coordination. Since 1998, SETSAN, has been an example of an institutional arrangement with a mandate to coordinate the implementation of FSN actions with the participation of multiple actors.

However, this institutional framework presents several limitations. Although FSN is included in most strategic macro-instruments, it is merely treated as a “cross-cutting issue” and not as an effective priority. This poses a great constraint in addressing food insecurity.

While there are many instruments (e.g. policies, strategies, programmes, projects) at different levels of hierarchy which all contribute to the promotion of FSN, there is no convergence among them. The institutional connection of SETSAN to the Ministry of Agriculture also presents a limitation to reaching the intersectoral approach. In fact, ESAN II is not getting appropriate financing. The greatest institutional deficiency concerns SETSAN limitations in terms of human and financial resources to effectively coordinate actions.

Nevertheless, the recent institutionalization of SETSAN and the institutional strengthening of this body in the short-term pose several challenges and open up new perspectives to further develop FSN governance in Mozambique.
### Annex 4. List of interviewees at the country level

#### BANGLADESH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution and position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso Alacevich</td>
<td>Economist – TCIN – FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe, Near East, North Africa, Central and South Asia Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominique Bordet</td>
<td>Senior Programme Development Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Support Service (TCSF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy and Programme Development Support Division (TCS) FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco Knowles</td>
<td>ESA – Backstopping officer for NFPCSP – FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciro Fiorillo</td>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor – NFPCSP – FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Jo A. Cortijo</td>
<td>Economist – NFPCSP – FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominique Burgeon</td>
<td>Representative – FAO Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Abdul Mannan</td>
<td>National Food Utilization &amp; Nutrition Advisor, NFPCSP – FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Md. Ruhul Amin Talukder</td>
<td>Research Director, FUN and Convenor, TT on Nutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Torab M. A. Rahim</td>
<td>Professor of Nutrition</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institute of Nutrition and Food Science</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dhaka University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rezaul Karim Talukder</td>
<td>FAO NFPCSP National Physical and Social Access Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalita Bhattacharjee</td>
<td>NFPCSP – FAO Nutritionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmudul Karim</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh Shrimp and Fish Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monirul Haque Naqvi</td>
<td>Additional General Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Md. Shah Alam</td>
<td>General Manager (Seed) Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amirul Islam</td>
<td>Action Aid Deputy Manager</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Md. Ali Sham Suddin</td>
<td>President Kendrio Krishok Moitre (KKM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Central Farmers Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rejwanul Haque</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Rural Development and Cooperative Division</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Badrul Arefin</td>
<td>FAO Representation National Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massimo La Rosa</td>
<td>REACH Country Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.M. Fakhrul Islam</td>
<td>National Consultant, Rapporteur of consultations of the CIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Md. Eunus Ali</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture Director, Field Service Wing, Department of Agricultural Extension,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Md. Nasir Uddin Ahmed</td>
<td>Retired DG Fisheries Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephane David</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Commission Attaché, Programme Manager - Food Security,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahihur Rahman Bhuiyan</td>
<td>USAID Senior Food Security and Ag Policy Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Md. Sayed Shibly</td>
<td>USAID Project Management Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ousmane Seck</td>
<td>Senior Rural Development Specialist, The World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugata Talukder</td>
<td>World Bank Operations Analyst, Ag and Rural Development Sector,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akhter Ahmed</td>
<td>IFPRI Chief of Party, Bangladesh Policy Research and Strategy Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naser Farid</td>
<td>MoFDM Director General, Food Policy Monitoring Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satyajit Karmaker</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance Deputy Secretary</td>
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### BRAZIL

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution and position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albaneide Peixinho</td>
<td>National Fund for Education Development/Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luciene Burlandy</td>
<td>Professor, School of Nutrition, Universidade Federal Fluminense (RJ) and Member of CONSEA and FBSSAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Emilia Pacheco</td>
<td>Director of the NGO FASE / Executive Coordination FBSSAN and ANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marília Leão</td>
<td>President of the NGO ABRANDH and member of CONSEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maya Takagi</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition National Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michele Lessa</td>
<td>CONSEA Executive Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milton Rondo</td>
<td>Minister - CG Hunger - Itamaraty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Pieri</td>
<td>Ministry of Agricultural Development (MDA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gustavo Chianca</td>
<td>FAO Representative Assistant</td>
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### ETHIOPIA

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abebe Hailemariam</td>
<td>UNICEF National Nutrition Project Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Cullis</td>
<td>FAO DRR/DRM Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Hassam</td>
<td>FAO - Assistant Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aregash Samuel</td>
<td>Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute - Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assefa Tsefaye</td>
<td>FAO Coordinator for North Shoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biniyam Tesfaye</td>
<td>Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute - Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biqualem Kefeleim</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Council - Health Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demisew Lemma</td>
<td>Ministry of Education - Resource Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan Harvey</td>
<td>Save the Children Us - Deputy Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmealen SHIFAYE</td>
<td>MOARD Deputy Director Agricultural Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehitetsakik Tirfe</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Council - FS Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuele Guerne</td>
<td>FAO Subregional Office for Eastern Africa- Livestock Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frew Tekabe</td>
<td>World Bank - Nutrition Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genet Moges</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda - PSNP and FAO beneficiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girmay Ayana</td>
<td>Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute - Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulelat Desse</td>
<td>Addis Ababa University - Food Science and Nutrition Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jutta Neitzel</td>
<td>WFP Head of Nutrition and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesele Belachew</td>
<td>CIDA Development consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesfin Gose</td>
<td>Ministry of Health - Nutrition focal point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muderis Abdulahi</td>
<td>World Bank Social protection Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigussie Alemayehu</td>
<td>FAO - Rural Development Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Cool-Black</td>
<td>World Bank - Africa Social Protection Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senait Zewdie</td>
<td>FAO National Health and Nutrition Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siamesew Tesera</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Council - Education Head Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Minae</td>
<td>FAO Subregional Office for Eastern Africa- Agribusiness &amp; enterprise development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talef Fitamok</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Council - Education Head Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamrat Tsegaye</td>
<td>MOARD Early Warning and Response Directorate Agronomist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tesfaye Chuko</td>
<td>UNICEF National Nutrition Project officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Institution and position</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilahun Bekele</td>
<td>Addis Ababa University - Food Science and Nutrition Lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tisemhalesa Abeba</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Council Women’s Affair Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsedale Begashaw</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Council Health Extension Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wondosen Gessesse</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Rural Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ymesnushal Limte</td>
<td>Menze Mama Woreda Council Agricultural Officer</td>
</tr>
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**MOZAMBIQUE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution and position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albert Lousseau</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora Mabjaia</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Assessor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Perez Ybarra</td>
<td>AECID, Spanish Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casimiro Abreu</td>
<td>INGC, General Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristina Matusse</td>
<td>Ministry of Development and Planning, National Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Clemente</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Permanent Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Cossa</td>
<td>SETSAN/FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felicidade Panguene</td>
<td>FAO, Programme Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecília Luna</td>
<td>FAO Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipe Pequenino</td>
<td>ActionAid International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurico Banze</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Director of Special Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacinto Uqueio</td>
<td>Fundação Desenvolvimento e Comunidade, Director Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Matsinhe</td>
<td>FAO, Programme Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kátia Santos</td>
<td>Helen Keller, Fortification Program Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lara Carrilho</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lázaro Santos</td>
<td>SETSAN/FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonardo Chavane</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, National Direction of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luís Muchunga</td>
<td>UNAC, Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maaike Arts</td>
<td>UNICEF, Nutrition Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcela Libombo</td>
<td>SETSAN, Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcelo Chaquite</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, National Director of Agrarian Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margarida Marques</td>
<td>Assistant FAO Representative - Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Saraiva</td>
<td>ROSA – National Network for Food Sovereignty, Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plácido Pereira</td>
<td>Ministry of State Administration, National Director</td>
</tr>
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Annex 5. Strengths and limitations of national FSN institutional frameworks

**Strengths of FSN frameworks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOZAMBIQUE</th>
<th>ETHIOPIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Political commitment to food security and nutrition at high level</td>
<td>• Government committed to FSN and has an initiative in place for the implementation of policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ownership and comprehensive multidimensional approach to FSN by different actors</td>
<td>• Reformed FSN institutional frameworks have facilitated cross-fertilization among agriculture, disaster management and social protection schemes, and synergies exist between emergency and development action to address chronic food insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A National FSN Strategy (ESAN II) with an RtF approach and a Plan of Action (PASAN II)</td>
<td>• Concentrated efforts and resources for the effective and sustainable implementation of specific programmes (e.g. PSNP, HABP) and instruments (e.g. a contingency fund) have resulted in the improvement of FSN outcomes and a higher potential for graduation from food insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integration of FSN into macro political instruments (POG, PARP) and in other sound sectoral strategies (e.g. PAMRDC)</td>
<td>• Good coherence among policies, programmes and instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordination structure (SETSAN) involving different governmental sectors and other stakeholders</td>
<td>• Building capacities of decentralized systems contribute to a more effective implementation of the programmes. There is good communication at decentralized levels among staff of different offices in charge of implementing different FSN programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring and assessment systems and working procedures shared between government and UN agencies</td>
<td>• Good managerial coordination for the PSNP due to high levels of investment in staff and resources available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participation of different actors (development partners, civil society) within SETSAN (working groups, technical council, advisory council) task force for the drafting process on the right to food law</td>
<td>• Spaces of coordination among development partners (Coalition for Food Security) have been opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Efforts made to improve CSO participation and dialogue, but CSOs working in this area are still weak, with the exception of some international NGOs</td>
<td><strong>BANGLADESH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Building capacities and sensitization activities contribute to a better inclusion of the RtF in policies and normative efforts</td>
<td>• Government is committed to agriculture and to improving targeted safety nets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BRAZIL</strong></td>
<td>• A comprehensive FSN policy framework (the National Food Policy), a programming document (Plan of Action) and an investment plan (the Country Investment Plan) are in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• FSN political commitment at Presidency level</td>
<td>• A comprehensive FSN institutional framework with an intersectoral platform at the highest political level (the Food Planning and Monitoring Committee), a championing leading institution (Food Planning and Monitoring Unit) and FSN intersectoral coordination bodies at political and technical levels have been developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• FSN institutionality has been constructed in conjunction with civil society, providing strength and legitimacy to FSN policies, institutions and laws</td>
<td>• There has been a significant increase in budget for implementation of FSN policies and programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The FSN National Plan has been built and prepared on an intersectoral basis and is supported by regulatory means</td>
<td>• Strong presence and inputs from civil society through the CONSEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There has been a significant increase in budget for implementation of FSN policies and programmes</td>
<td>• Intersectoral dialogue and CAISAN Executive Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strong presence and inputs from civil society through the CONSEA</td>
<td>• The RtF, as set out within the Federal Constitution Magna Carta, is an integral part of most important Brazilian laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intersectoral dialogue and CAISAN Executive Secretaries</td>
<td>• CONSEA is able to put together proposals on laws concerning FSN policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The RtF, as set out within the Federal Constitution Magna Carta, is an integral part of most important Brazilian laws</td>
<td><strong>BRAZIL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• CONSEA is able to put together proposals on laws concerning FSN policies</td>
<td><strong>BRAZIL</strong></td>
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Limitations of FSN frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOZAMBIQUE</th>
<th>ETHIOPIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of political engagement to reinforce SETSAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of effective intersectoral coordination and limited political dialogue and action</td>
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<tr>
<td>• No specific budgetary line to finance the implementation of ESAN II</td>
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<td>• Lack of resources for SETSAN and limited technical capacity at central and decentralized levels, leading to use of resources allocated to other ministerial activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Starting FSN decentralization process through provincial and district SETSAN units</td>
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<td>• Weak alignment with donors</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Weak involvement of civil society and private sector in FSN policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>• More balance needed between actions on food availability and actions on food access and utilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of FSN mainstreaming and “silo-ization” of FSN issues: Nutrition is confined to the MoH and school feeding to the MoE, both at policy and implementation levels</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Weak coordination of the nutrition programme and lack of participation of other ministries. Need for leadership to be taken in coordination and appropriate resources and decision-making powers to be assigned to this sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Room for improvement in the accountability role of state powers (interministerial and legislative), yet counteracted by effective donor accountability and adequate memorandums of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of involvement of civil society in FSN policies and institutions</td>
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<tr>
<th>BANGLADESH</th>
<th>BRAZIL</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Uneven ownership of the FSN policy and institutional framework among ministries. FSN results framework has not yet been internalized in public institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Weak linkages between nutrition and agriculture issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of institutionalized mechanisms for participation of civil society, including producers and private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>• More balance needed between actions on food availability and actions on food access and utilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The CIP is very ambitious. The financial gap probably exceeds the national implementation capacity</td>
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<td>• Lack of expertise in planning and monitoring FSN interventions under a comprehensive approach</td>
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<td>• Limited number of gender indicators (mainly on nutrition issues)</td>
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<td>• Sustainability after completion of the NFPCSP is not secured</td>
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<td>• Very centralized policies, weak linkages between local and central governments</td>
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<td>• Few mechanisms for enforcing public policies within legal frameworks, showing the restrictive views that still exist in relation to the FSN policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Decentralization process is slow because municipalities are bureaucratic and weak in technical skills for management of additional resources for developing FSN actions</td>
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<td>• Lack of regulatory capacity to build public policies to promote RTF due to influence from food markets and the food industry</td>
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<td>• Setbacks identified in certain policies, such as Land Reform and the Control of Agro-chemicals and Genetically Modified Organisms</td>
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Annex 6. Mapping FSN institutional architectures

Based on the analysis of FSN institutional experiences, six variables were identified for analysing FSN institutional architectures: provision of interministerial coordination schemes; creation of institutional spaces representing civil society’s demands; endowment of legally supported mechanisms; existence of effective decentralized systems for FSN coordination; focus on supra-sectoral FSN objectives further than sectoral objectives; and mechanisms to monitor progress using results-based management systems.

A radar illustration, in which the axes represent the significance of these variables defining the FSN institutional architecture, shows the comprehensive approach of FSN institutional frameworks in Brazil and the areas in which more efforts are needed to achieve a more comprehensive process of FSN institutionalization.

Radar illustrations for Bangladesh and Mozambique show a low dynamism of FSN frameworks and certain linearity. Efforts are focused on intra-government coordination and monitoring, and decentralization, or civil society representation, is just beginning.

Evidence for axis valorisation:

- Balanced intra-government coordination through the creation of CAISAN
- Consolidation of SISAN, CONSEA and CAISAN at state and local level is in process, still with many expectations
- Participation of non-state actors through the National Conferences and CONSEA has been formally institutionalized, influencing policies at the highest level
- FSN indicators produced by CONSEA have been constructed on an intersectoral basis and civil society actively participates in accountability for results
- FSN legal mechanisms support the creation of coordinating institutions (LOA 2006)
- FSN National Plan has been built and prepared on an intersectoral basis, having legally consolidated this format
The radar illustration in Ethiopia shows that FSN framework activity is based on strong accountability of results, decentralization and robust linkages between FSN sectoral goals with development objectives.
Evidence for axis valorisation:

- Intra-governmental coordination: Strong relationship between MOARD and MOFED for implementing PSNP/Weak relationship with other line ministries (Health and Education)
- Coordination strongly decentralized
- Little involvement of civil society in FSN architecture
- FSN indicators are not mainstreamed in line ministries, but monitoring and accountability of results at the sectoral level is strong
- No legal mechanisms to support FSN coordination
- Synergies have been possible between different policies within the same line ministry to achieve supra-sectoral objectives